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BUYER BEWARE: VARIATION AND OPACITY IN ESG
AND ESG INDEX FUNDS
Dana Brakman Reiser and Anne Tucker †

Evidence of the tremendous rise in the significance of environmental, social, and
governance (ESG) investing is coming from all quarters. Fund flows into ESG
investment vehicles are growing at a sustained and sometimes exponential pace. Fund
complexes are rushing to design products, creating and rebranding scores of mutual
funds and exchange traded funds (ETFs), including lower-cost indexed options.
Industry leaders, critics, and commentators are all heralding the sea change as a shift
in investing—and corporate governance—to more broadly consider environmental
and social factors.
This Article provides vital context for this conversation. Its descriptive account
of the ESG investment landscape drawn from hand-collected 2018–2019 data on a
sample of active and passive ESG and traditional funds documents great variation in
their investment strategies, portfolios, voting records, and fees. The underlying
variation across funds, however, is largely opaque to consumers—who rely on the ESG
acronym at their peril. Building on our case study, we examine the supply and demand
side drivers fueling ESG market growth, variation, and opacity, and explore
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Joshua Roye for invaluable research assistance.
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mechanisms to better match high-ESG committed investors to high-ESG committed
funds, including enhanced transparency and regulation of intermediaries.
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INTRODUCTION
Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) investing—
investment strategies that incorporate the environmental, social, and
governance practices of investee firms in portfolio composition and
management—grew by leaps and bounds in the last decade. At the start
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of 2020, the market offered investors roughly 300 ESG funds 1—a subset
of the more broadly defined sustainable funds. 2 This number represents
huge growth (considering there were ninety “sustainable” funds in
2014). 3 Fund growth in this area outpaces growth in traditional mutual
fund and exchange traded fund (ETF) markets. ESG funds manage
increasingly large pools of capital. After several years of growth, in 2018
ESG funds gained $5.5 billion assets under management (AUM). 4 In
2019, ESG inflows shattered prior records reaching over $20 billion 5—
growth in large part attributable to re-branding of existing funds into ESG
products. 6

1 John Hale, Sustainable Fund Flows in 2019 Smash Previous Records, MORNINGSTAR (Jan. 10,
2020),
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/961765/sustainable-fund-flows-in-2019-smashprevious-records [https://perma.cc/PS7X-F37X]; see also MORNINGSTAR, SUSTAINABLE FUNDS U.S.
LANDSCAPE REPORT 1 (2020) [hereinafter MORNINGSTAR 2020] (“After having steadily gained
prominence over the past decade, sustainable investing appears to be reaching a tipping point. For
evidence, one need look no further than the nearly fourfold increase in assets that flowed into
sustainable funds in the United States in 2019.”).
2 “While the definition of sustainable investing continues to evolve, this refers to a range of
overarching investing approaches or strategies that encompass values-based investing, negative
screening (exclusions), thematic and impact investing, ESG integration, company engagement and
proxy voting. These are not mutually exclusive.” A Decade of Sustainable Funds Investing: 10
Years/10 Charts, SUSTAINABLE INVESTING, https://www.sustainableinvest.com/sustainableinvesting-decade [https://perma.cc/24BX-9U6C].
3 See MORNINGSTAR, SUSTAINABLE FUNDS U.S. LANDSCAPE REPORT 3, 6 (2018),
https://cdn.ymaws.com/dciia.org/resource/collection/8606CD14-06A5-4277-9507C397C1C8DEA0/Sustainable_Funds_Landscape_013018.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Z5V-ATGU].
4 MORNINGSTAR 2020, supra note 1, at 14 (noting a $5.5 billion in net flows in 2018 to
sustainable funds); see also MORNINGSTAR, SUSTAINABLE FUNDS U.S. LANDSCAPE REPORT 11–12
(2018),
https://cdn.ymaws.com/dciia.org/resource/collection/8606CD14-06A5-4277-9507C397C1C8DEA0/Sustainable_Funds_Landscape_013018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4Z5V-ATGU].
“Investor interest in ESG funds, alongside market appreciation, drove a 37% annual increase in
assets to $445 billion in 2017.” Sustainable Investing Grows on Pensions, Millennials, BLOOMBERG
(Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/sustainable-investing-growspensions-millennials [https://perma.cc/LDW5-75AK].
5 MORNINGSTAR 2020, supra note 1 (reporting “flows into sustainable funds totaled $21.4
billion in 2019”).
6 See A Decade of Sustainable Funds Investing: 10 Years/10 Charts, supra note 2;
MORNINGSTAR 2020, supra note 1 (“In 2019, 30 new funds launched (plus one in late December
2018 that did not make it into last year’s report) and 11 existing conventional funds were
repurposed as sustainable funds.”).

1924

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1921

ESG markets, like the U.S. fund market more generally, frequently
incorporate passive strategies. 7 Passively managed funds compose about
a third of the sustainable funds market. 8 No longer a niche or specialty
area, ESG investing today is massive. Global ESG assets under
management reached $30 trillion in 2019. 9
This transformation can be seen not only in ballooning fund options
and AUM but also in the dramatic shift in the conversation around the
contours of investing and corporate governance. Investment industry
leaders like State Street and BlackRock are issuing commitments to use
ESG factors to build and manage investment portfolios. 10 Those leading
7 Passive management refers to the practice of building a fund portfolio to match an external
index or set of rules for firm inclusion and retention, such as funds with portfolios constructed to
match the S&P 500 or Russell 3000 indexes of companies. See Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of
the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial
Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 298–99 (2017). Passive contrasts with active management, under which
fund managers select investments for inclusion and retention in a fund portfolio based on their
own research and predictions about the investment’s quality and fitness for a fund. See id. at 299.
As passive strategies require far less research and ongoing assessment, they are associated with
lower fees. See id. at 302. Passive investment strategies are rising in popularity in large part because,
net of fees, on aggregate they tend to match or outperform active alternatives. See id. For statistics
on the size and growth of passive investing, see generally id. and see also infra notes 48–52.
8 See MORNINGSTAR 2020, supra note 1 (reporting 2019 numbers); Reshma Kapadia,
Sustainable Funds’ Big Divide: Active vs. Passive Investing, BARRON’S (Feb. 7, 2020, 2:35 PM),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/sustainable-funds-big-divide-active-vs-passive-investing51581104128 [https://perma.cc/HFS5-6LFN].
9 Pippa Stevens, Your Complete Guide to Investing with a Conscience, a $30 Trillion Market
Just Getting Started, CNBC (Dec. 14, 2019, 8:15 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/14/yourcomplete-guide-to-socially-responsible-investing.html
[https://perma.cc/4HZC-FLJ5];
see
Sustainable Investing Grows on Pensions, Millennials, supra note 4 (noting that global estimates
include investments “labeled as sustainable, responsible or ethical investing” and amounted to $23
trillion in prior years and citing to estimates provided by the Global Sustainable Investment
Alliance).
10 See, e.g., Letter from Cyrus Taraporevala, President & Chief Exec. Officer, State St. Glob.
Advisors, to Board Members, State St. Glob. Advisors (Jan. 28, 2020),
https://www.ssga.com/library-content/pdfs/insights/CEOs-letter-on-SSGA-2020-proxy-votingagenda.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3XE-TSDT] (announcing State Street’s plan “to use our proxy
voting power to ensure companies are identifying material ESG issues and incorporating the
implications into their long-term strategy”); Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman & Chief Exec.
Officer, BlackRock, to Chief Executive Officers, A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance (Jan. 2020),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/
C7TG-39BJ]; see also Robert G. Eccles & Svetlana Klimenko, The Investor Revolution, HARV. BUS.
REV., May–June 2019, at 106 (reporting broad agreement among top executives across global
investment companies and asset owners that ESG issues are an important component in evaluating
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some of the largest portfolio companies have likewise signaled a shift to
support stakeholder—rather than shareholder only—focused
governance. 11 The Big Four accounting firms and corporate members of
World Economic Forum pledged to develop metrics for corporate
reporting on ESG issues. 12 While there are those who challenge the
ascendance of stakeholderism and ESG, 13 many prominent
commentators are broadcasting strong support for the shift as key to
long-term investing. 14
In this brave new world where investment and corporate titans tout
ESG strategies, investors appear able to secure an enticing combination
of traditional investment objectives and far more ambitious ones. In
addition to savings or wealth building, ESG products are intended to
combat the risks posed by poor governance practices that threaten the
stability of capital markets and the economy writ large. They are also
intended to counter the existential threats posed by social inequality and
climate change. But the substance of environmental, social, and
governance considerations in ESG investing is essentially unregulated.
Merely flagging the use of ESG factors satisfies securities regulation
disclosure mandates but does little to illuminate for investors how a

long-term investments); supra notes 225–233 and accompanying text (discussing BlackRock’s
evolution on this issue over the past few years).
11 See Our Commitment, BUS. ROUNDTABLE, https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/
ourcommitment [perma.cc/Y7QD-F33X] (“[M]odernizing its principles on the role of the
corporation” to clarify that “[e]ach of our stakeholders is essential[] . . . [and] commit[ting] to
deliver[ing] value to all of them, for the future success of our companies, our communities and our
country”).
12 See Press Release, World Econ. F., Measuring Stakeholder Capitalism: World’s Largest Cos.
Support Developing Core Set of Universal ESG Disclosures (Jan. 22, 2020),
https://www.weforum.org/press/2020/01/measuring-stakeholder-capitalism-world-s-largestcompanies-support-developing-core-set-of-universal-esg-disclosures
[https://perma.cc/29A4J8T2].
13 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance,
CORNELL L. REV. (Dec. 2020) (arguing the shift to stakeholderism will decrease both board
accountability and pressure for regulatory reforms necessary to better protect stakeholders).
14 See, e.g., Martin Lipton et al., Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2020, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Dec. 10, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/12/10/thoughts-for-boardsof-directors-in-2020 [https://perma.cc/3QGQ-T3UW] (arguing corporate leaders should be
“focusing not just on profits, but also on the corporation’s broader purpose and role in the
economic and societal ecosystem in order to build a sustainable and long-term value proposition”);
Editorial Bd., Investors Should Look Beyond the Bottom Line, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/30b3b8d2-f014-11e9-ad1e-4367d8281195.
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particular investment product will use these factors or how to assess
whether it has done so effectively. In non-ESG investing, profit, income,
and growth have consistent meanings across products, so their disclosure
alone allows investors to make useful comparisons between them. In
contrast, what qualifies as ESG performance is unclear and contested.
Mere disclosure that a fund practices ESG investing will do little to
unpack these terms for investors.
To unpack ESG in practice, we conduct a case study of ESG
investment practices among “top” funds in 2018–2019 and compare it
against non-ESG products in the same fund family. In doing so, we
observe two contrasts: ESG versus non-ESG investments and the
variation between ESG funds. In our review, we find that ESG
transactions are not standardized. There is, in fact, great variation in ESG
strategies, holdings, voting practices, and fees. Further, on the matter of
holdings and voting, not all ESG funds are distinguishable from non-ESG
funds. The ESG implementation continuum is not facially evident to
investing consumers and it is hard to unearth. As two experienced
researchers, we poured over filings and third-party sites to observe
glimpses of ESG in practice. With our case study, we first confirm nonstandardization within the ESG market and then provide a descriptive
account of the ESG market drivers and the consequences of opaque ESG.
We conclude that investors generally get the ESG that they pay for,
meaning that high-fee, niche funds have more ESG differentiated
holdings and voting patterns. High fees alone, however, do not signal a
good ESG return per se. High fees and niche products alone, simply
provide an ordering mechanism within our sample. Confusion around
ESG implementation creates barriers to high-ESG-committed investors
willing to pay so that their capital can support greater ESG impact firms,
not just Disney, Amazon, and JP Morgan as many generalist funds do.
Existing securities laws provide no remedy. Other possible sources
of regulation to define and regularize the ESG concept likewise provide
little insight to investors. The Department of Labor (DOL) can function
as a kind of shadow securities regulator through its oversight of ERISAgoverned plans. 15 Its limited guidance on ESG investing, though, is a
fairly foreboding warning—ERISA fiduciaries may engage in ESG
15 See Anita K. Krug, The Other Securities Regulator: A Case Study in Regulatory Damage, 92
TUL. L. REV. 339, 350–56 (2017) (describing the DOL’s overlapping jurisdiction with the SEC in an
article criticizing the former’s 2016 rule designating securities brokers as fiduciaries under ERISA).
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investing (whatever that may be) but they are reminded that they cannot
do so in any way that would sacrifice returns for beneficiaries. This
cautionary instruction does nothing to help delineate the ESG
marketplace for investors or product creators. ESG investing has evolved
in a relative legal vacuum.
The rise of passive ESG investing adds another dimension to the
puzzle. When funds double down on enticing promises of low-fee, guiltfree retirement, how can investors separate fact from fiction? Further,
passive ESG necessarily relies on the proliferation of ESG indices and
other metrics against which these funds construct their portfolios. An
ESG index fund cannot be launched without an ESG index to track. The
content of ESG indices could be subjected to regulation, which would
indirectly regulate ESG investment products. But while indices have
become hugely influential in the market, they are currently developed as
proprietary systems by private companies and exist entirely outside the
reach of the U.S. financial regulatory architecture. 16 Passive products thus
further obscure ESG implementation. To consider these consequences as
well, we include a passive ESG sample in our study, creating a comparison
between passive and active ESG, as well as with non-ESG funds.
In all comparisons, we conclude that the ESG label acts more as a
product signal and branding mechanism than it does a promise of a
specific investment strategy or avoided externalities. After concluding
that the ESG market signal alone is not enough to match high-ESG
commitment investors to high ESG funds—an idea consistent with
current literature accounts in law and finance, 17 we explore regulatory
16 See
Fast Answers: Market Indices, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/
answersindiceshtm.html [https://perma.cc/RA63-3YAR] (stating “[t]he SEC does not regulate the
content of these indices and is not endorsing those described here”).
17 Paul Brest, Ronald J. Gilson, and Mark A. Wolfson introduce a taxonomy of sociallymotivated investors (neutral, values aligned, and value creation) to address their concerns that
funds use imprecise and misleading terminology to describe social investments with the implied
consequence of misdirecting socially-motivated capital. Paul Brest et al., How Investors Can (and
Can’t) Create Social Value (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 394/2018, 2018). Brad
M. Barber, Adair Morse, and Ayako Yasuda, in their paper Impact Investing, document investors’
willingness to pay for social/environmental returns in the form of reduced financial returns and
also note a range of “willingness-to-pay” among heterogenous investors. Brad Barber et al., Impact
Investing (Dec. 12, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2705556
[https://perma.cc/NQ7Z-6F6P]. A third impact investing article also discusses the range of investor
and fund commitment to social benefit returns and the difficulty of matching highly-committed
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and market solutions. Our work contributes to existing scholarship on
ESG investing 18 and builds upon prior scholarly debates over corporate
purpose, 19 corporate social (and environmental) responsibility, 20 and
sustainable investing. 21
Part I details how ESG investing has been operationalized, focusing
closely on the new trend of passive ESG and the special challenges it
raises. A key contribution of this Part is its compilation of data drawn
investors to highly-committed funds, a problem partially addressed in private markets through
contracts. Christopher Geczy et al., Contracts with (Social) Benefits: The Implementation of Impact
Investing 23 (July 1, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3159731
[https://perma.cc/LE56-RA7W].
18 See e.g., Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business Case for Monitoring
Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647 (2016) (advocating for the realignment of long-term firm
value, ESG, and regulatory goals); Susan N. Gary, Values and Value: University Endowments,
Fiduciary Duties, and ESG Investing, 42 J.C. & U.L. 247 (2016) (investigating alignment of fiduciary
duties and ESG investing); Florian Berg et al., Aggregate Confusion: The Divergence of ESG Ratings
(MIT Sloan Sch. Working Paper No. 5822-19, 2019) (documenting divergence of ESG rating scores
and the variation of constituent metrics). For a literature review of ESG and related scholarship, see
Deborah Burand & Anne Tucker, Legal Literature Review of Social Entrepreneurship and Impact
Investing (2007-2017): Doing Good by Doing Business, 11 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1 (2019).
19 See, e.g., Malcolm S. Salter, Rehabilitating Corporate Purpose (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working
Paper No. 19-104, 2019) (arguing for a definition of corporate purpose that is “established moral
and economic principles that challenge those underlying the shareholder value maximization
doctrine”); Afra Afsharipour, Redefining Corporate Purpose: An International Perspective, 40
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 465 (2017) (analyzing the Indian Companies Act, drawing comparisons, and
identifying lessons for corporate law); LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW
PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012)
(questing shareholder value as the predominant measure of corporate purpose and proposing
alternatives).
20 See, e.g., Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, The Virtuous Corporation: On Corporate Social Motivation
and the Law, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 341 (2017) (creating a taxonomy for corporate social motivations);
Jacob Park & Sonia Kowal, Socially Responsible Investing 3.0: Understanding Finance and
Environmental, Social, and Governance Issues in Emerging Markets, 18 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 17
(2013) (declaring a “third stage of socially responsible investing” where SRI is a “market reality” in
emerging economies); Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Boards and New Environmentalism, 31 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 291 (2007) (noting the increasing business case for corporate
managers to care about environmental impact and risks).
21 See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty & Quentin Karpilow, Harnessing Investor Interest in Sustainability:
The Next Frontier in Environmental Information Regulation, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 625 (2019)
(advocating for mandatory corporate ESG disclosure to facilitate realignment of capital markets
with sustainability principles); Meir Statman, ESG as Waving Banners and as Pulling Plows, 46 J.
PORTFOLIO MGMT. ETHICAL INVESTING 16 (2020) (creating a behavioral finance taxonomy of ESG
investors and expectations); Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New
Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987 (2009) (harmonizing sustainability goals
and corporate governance).
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from a study of the operations of thirty-one actively- and passivelymanaged ESG funds and seven non-ESG comparators, pulling data from
2018–2019. In an attempt to discern whether ESG funds are doing
something consistent—and consistently different from non-ESG funds—
and whether their actions likely align with investor expectations, we
hand-collect the investment strategy disclosures, fees, portfolio holdings,
shareholder proposal voting records, and tracking errors for each of these
funds. Our results confirm that the ESG label alone conveys little
information to investors; fund operations vary widely among ESG funds
and often overlap with those of non-ESG funds.
As legal regulation only weakly confines ESG investment activity,
the next two Parts turn to the force that is driving its growth and
implementation: the market. Part II focuses on the role of demand in the
growth of the field. Recognizing that ESG investors with different goals
(and subject to different regulatory regimes) will have varying appetites
for ESG products, this Part maps the contours of the contributions of
individual and various types of institutional investors to ESG demand.
Part III then turns to the supply side, the role of which has thus far gone
largely unexplored and underappreciated. We identify the considerable
incentives that investment product creators—fund complexes and index
providers in particular—have to expand their ESG investing footprints.
The collective takeaway of these Parts exposes serious gaps between
reality and the reasonable expectations of investors and society about the
capacity of ESG investing to solve social problems. Those gaps are
barriers to matching high ESG-committed investors to high ESG funds.
Part IV returns to the question of regulation. It first considers how
market forces may shift to incentivize greater accountability and
consistency in ESG investment products. Then it sketches the potential
legal paths securities regulation, ERISA law, and regulation of index
providers might follow to narrow the gap between ESG investor
expectations and reality to facilitate better matching. It also offers
recommendations for future research.
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I. ESG INVESTING EXPLORED
A.

Introduction to ESG Investing

ESG investing has longstanding roots, spanning examples as diverse
as the limitations placed on investment under Sharia law, John Wesley’s
instructions for his followers to avoid stocks that conflicted with
Methodist religious teachings, and the environmental and South African
divestment movements. 22 Early iterations of socially-inflected mutual
fund offerings often screened out “sin” stocks, such as equity in
companies that produced alcohol, armaments, or tobacco. 23 These
exclusionary (or “negative”) screen investment products have been
available for decades. Until recently, however, they attracted only a niche
audience of highly-committed investors, as the business case for such
investing was, at best, unclear.
Exclusionary screens’ necessary diversification limits raise concerns
that using these strategies to incorporate ESG factors in investment will
reduce financial returns. Many studies have borne out these concerns. 24
Others find negative screening can be deployed without lowering riskadjusted returns, 25 however; and negative screening continues to be an

22 See Lloyd Kurtz, Socially Responsible Investment and Shareholder Activism, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 249, 249–55 (Andrew Crane et al. eds. 2008).
23 See Casey C. Clark & Andy Kirkpatrick, Impact Investing Under the Uniform Prudent Investor
Act, 32 PROB. & PROP. 32, 33 (2018).
24 See, e.g., Pieter Jan Trinks & Bert Scholtens, The Opportunity Cost of Negative Screening in
Socially Responsible Investing, 140 J. BUS. ETHICS 193 (2017) (testing a wide variety of negative
screens and finding they frequently result in underperformance); Samuel A. Mueller, The
Opportunity Cost of Discipleship: Ethical Mutual Funds and Their Returns, 52 SOC. ANALYSIS 111
(1991) (finding nine out of ten mutual funds negatively screened for compliance with ethical
restrictions underperformed the market).
25 See Susan N. Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term: Fiduciary Duties and ESG Integration, 90
U. COLO. L. REV. 731, 752 (2019) (pointing to “two metastudies conclud[ing] that funds using
negative screens are more likely to show neutral rather than negative or positive performance when
compared to non-SRI benchmarks”); ALEXANDER MONK, SCHRODERS, DEMYSTIFYING NEGATIVE
SCREENS: THE FULL IMPLICATIONS OF ESG EXCLUSIONS (2017) (explaining that screening methods
vary widely and many need not have significant negative impacts on long-term performance,
particularly in the actively managed context).
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important component of ESG investing today. 26 For example, the
Vanguard FTSE Social Index excludes “weapons, tobacco, gambling,
alcohol, adult entertainment, and nuclear power” companies. 27 New
funds utilizing negative screens also continue to come online. In the wake
of the Parkland school shootings, fund giant BlackRock offered
institutional investors the ability to exclude gun stocks from their
portfolios and created gun-free ETFs. 28
Numerous other strategies have also been developed to incorporate
ESG factors in investing, including both active and passive approaches to
composing portfolios of high performing ESG companies. Some active
funds practice full integration, considering ESG factors as part of the
valuation process for every investment decision. 29 For example, at the
Morgan Stanley Institutional Global Opportunity Fund the “investment
process integrates analysis of sustainability with respect to disruptive
change, financial strength, environmental and social externalities and

26 See Stuart Kirk, How ESG Can Have Unintended Consequences, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/e32bb67e-ebc9-3407-a83b-b2524a688222 [https://perma.cc/W6EEPC2Q] (“Stock screening is by far the most popular way to invest based on ESG principles,
accounting for more than three-quarters of responsibly managed assets globally.”)
27 Vanguard FTSE Soc. Index Fund, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Dec. 3, 2018).
28 See Leslie P. Norton, BlackRock’s Larry Fink: The New Conscience of Wall Street?, FIN. NEWS
LONDON (June 26, 2018, 7:47 AM), https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/blackrocks-larry-fink-thenew-conscience-of-wall-street-20180626 [https://perma.cc/29B8-S43Q]. As a major index fund
provider, these new funds did not dislodge BlackRock as a large investor in weapons companies,
including the manufacturer of the gun used at Parkland. Negative screens are incompatible with a
pure index strategy, though BlackRock and other index fund providers have pledged to engage with
gun manufacturers on issues raised by mass shootings. See, e.g., Matt Levine, BlackRock Ends up in
an
Awkward
Place
on
Guns,
BLOOMBERG
(Apr.
8,
2018,
9:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-04-08/larry-fink-s-blackrock-ends-up-in-anawkward-place-on-guns [https://perma.cc/328J-JM48]; Liz Moyer, Student Activist David Hogg
Calls for Boycott of Vanguard and Blackrock over Gunmaker Ownership, CNBC (Apr. 17, 2018, 5:00
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/17/student-activist-david-hogg-calls-for-boycott-ofvanguard-and-blackrock-over-gunmaker-ownership.html [https://perma.cc/3TZ5-JBJY] (noting
some activists’ calls to boycott BlackRock and other index fund providers).
29 See Amir Amel-Zadeh & George Serafeim, Why and How Investors Use ESG Information:
Evidence from a Global Survey, 74 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 87, 93–95 (2018) (finding 34.4% of investors in
the survey used full integration; again, U.S. investors lagged Europeans, with only 27.1% of the
former using engagement strategies, and 48.1% of the latter); Robert G. Eccles et al., How to
Integrate ESG into Investment Decision-Making: Results of a Global Survey of Institutional Investors,
29 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 125, 125–26 (2017) (finding only twenty-one percent utilized this strategy
in a global study of asset owners and managers).
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governance.” 30 Other active ESG strategies require portfolio companies
to post minimum performance on ESG factors for inclusion in a fund or
include leading ESG companies in a fund to tilt its overall composition in
that direction. 31 Still others develop thematic ESG investment products
like clean energy, water, or other specialized investment funds. The AB
Sustainable Global Thematic A Fund, for example, “identifies sustainable
investment themes that are broadly consistent with achieving the United
Nations Sustainable Development Goals.” 32 Passive ESG funds rely on
specially-designed ESG or sustainability indices to build their offerings,
and will be discussed in more detail in Section I.B.
In addition to using various strategies to incorporate ESG factors
into investment selection, ESG funds also practice engagement. 33 They
utilize their power as shareholders—to vote for directors, on fundamental
transactions and shareholder proposals, make shareholder proposals, and
more informal efforts to influence management—to drive ESG changes
in investee companies. 34 To some degree, as most ESG funds are
composed of equity securities, 35 they cannot help engaging as they are
called upon to vote their shares. Many ESG fund sponsors, however, see
Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund, Inc., Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Apr. 30, 2018).
See Amel-Zadeh & Serafeim, supra note 29, at 93–95 (describing these strategies and
reporting relatively lower levels of use than engagement and full integration, as reported by survey
participants); Eccles et al., supra note 29, at 125–26 (reporting greater use of such techniques, thirtyseven percent for best-in-class selection and twenty-nine percent for thematic investing, in a global
study of asset owners and managers).
32 AB Sustainable Glob. Thematic Fund, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Oct. 31, 2018).
33 See Amel-Zadeh & Serafeim, supra note 29, at 94–95 (finding 37.1% of global investors
utilizing engagement strategies, though this finding was dominated by European investors; only
27.1% of US investors reported using this strategy, while 40.2% still used negative screening; 48.1%
of European investors in the study utilized engagement); Eccles et al., supra note 29, at 125–26
(reporting twenty-one percent of respondents used engagement strategies in a global study of asset
managers and asset owners who either implemented ESG investing already or planned to do so,
while forty-seven percent used negative screening).
34 See Sean J. Griffith, Opt-In Stewardship: Toward an Optimal Delegation of Mutual Fund
Voting Authority, 98 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 6–7) (on file with author)
(describing the “rise of stewardship”).
35 See MORNINGSTAR 2020, supra note 1 (noting that while there is growth in fixed income
sustainable funds, they still represent a relatively small slice of the market); see also MORNINGSTAR,
PASSIVE SUSTAINABLE FUNDS: THE GLOBAL LANDSCAPE 5 (2018) [hereinafter MORNINGSTAR,
PASSIVE
SUSTAINABLE
FUNDS],
https://www.morningstar.com/lp/passive-esglandscape?cid=RED_RES0002 (noting “embryonic” stage of development of the passive sustainable
fixed-income market).
30
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engagement beyond voting as an important component of their ESG
orientation. 36 For example, Calvert, sponsor of several ESG funds in our
sample, describes engagement as a key part of “how we’re different,”
explaining that by “combining our proprietary research models with a
structured corporate engagement framework, we work toward building
sustainable long-term value in both the companies we invest in and our
clients’ portfolios.” 37
Table 1 below illustrates different ESG investment strategies, as
stated in funds’ investment strategy disclosures.
Table 1: ESG Investment Strategies
Category: ESG Scoring/ Screening

Ex: Vanguard FTSE Social Index 38

ESG attributes of companies are scored and higher scoring companies are
selected for investment or inclusion in an index. Conversely, non-ESG
attributes (i.e., tobacco, armaments, etc.) may exclude a company from
investment.
Category: ESG Integration

Ex: Morgan Stanley Inst. Global
Opp. 39

Considering ESG factors as part of the valuation process for every investment
decision.
Category: ESG Active Governance

Ex: Calvert Equity Fund 40

36 Engagement also enables non-ESG branded funds to respond to ESG concerns in their
investment portfolios. Indeed, engagement is likely to be the only available strategy for passive funds
locked into non-ESG indexes to address ESG issues in their portfolios.
37 How
We’re Different, CALVERT, https://www.calvert.com/how-we-are-different.php
[https://perma.cc/VVK3-TN62].
38 Vanguard FTSE Soc. Index Fund, supra note 27.

The Index is market-capitalization-weighted and includes primarily large- and mid-cap
U.S. stocks that have been screened for certain criteria related to the environment,
human rights, health and safety, labor standards, and diversity. The Index excludes
companies . . . involved with weapons, tobacco, gambling, alcohol, adult entertainment,
and nuclear power.
Id.
39 “The investment process integrates analysis of sustainability with respect to disruptive
change, financial strength, environmental and social externalities and governance (also referred to
as ESG).” Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund, Inc., supra note 30.
40 “[R]esearch is guided by The Calvert Principles for Responsible Investment, which provide
a framework for considering environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) factors that may affect
investment performance.” Calvert Equity Fund, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Feb. 1, 2018).

1934

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1921

Voting in support of ESG favorable resolutions through proxy voting, propose
ESG favorable shareholder resolutions, and engage management on ESG
related issues.
Category: ESG Operationalized
Portfolio Companies

Ex: AB Sustainable Global Thematic
A 41

ESG-focused theme such as clean water, clean energy, solar, or sustainable
development goals.

It still remains difficult to conduct industry-wide studies because
ESG investing practices are so wide-ranging, and costs of utilizing these
strategies can be high, 42 but data showing ESG investing need not sacrifice
returns—and indeed may increase them—is beginning to mount. Studies
have found that incorporating a wide array of ESG investment strategies,
like those identified above, outperforms negative screening alone. 43 In a
comparison of portfolios using ESG factors with non-ESG portfolios, the
former often outperformed the latter, and provided lower volatility and
risk. 44 An influential study of firm performance also found that “firms
with strong ratings on material sustainability topics outperform firms
41

The Adviser identifies sustainable investment themes that are broadly consistent with
achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. Examples of these themes
may include energy transformation, resource preservation, equality and opportunity,
and improving human health and safeguarding lives, and the themes are expected to
change over time based on the Adviser’s research. In addition to this “top-down”
thematic approach, the Adviser also uses a “bottom-up” analysis of individual
companies, focusing on prospective earnings growth, valuation, and quality of company
management and on evaluating a company’s exposure to environmental, social and
corporate governance (“ESG”) factors.
AB Sustainable Glob. Thematic Fund, supra note 32.
42 See, e.g., Michael Cappucci, The ESG Integration Paradox, 30 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 22, 23–
26 (2018).
43 See, e.g., Gunnar Friede et al., ESG and Financial Performance: Aggregated Evidence from
More than 2000 Empirical Studies, 5 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 210 (2015); Michael L. Barnett &
Robert M. Salomon, Beyond Dichotomy: The Curvilinear Relationship Between Social Responsibility
and Financial Performance, 27 STRATEGY MGMT. J. 1101 (2006) (collecting studies reaching
contradictory conclusions and arguing that the divergence can be explained in part by the variation
in methods used by different socially responsible investing techniques).
44 See Tim Verheyden et al., ESG for All? The Impact of ESG Screening on Return, Risk, and
Diversification, 28 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 47, 50–51 (2016).
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with poor ratings on these topics.” 45 A metastudy of over two thousand
studies of ESG investment performance concluded that “the business case
for ESG investing is empirically well founded” and that “[i]nvesting in
ESG pays financially.” 46
B.

Passive ESG

The latest development in ESG investing is its combination with
passive strategies tracking indices to offer investors both diversification
and competitive pricing. 47 Unlike active funds, in which fund managers
seek to pick winning investments and avoid losing ones as they construct
their portfolios, passive investments utilize an externally created index
and map their portfolios to it as much as possible. For example, the
iShares Core S&P 500 ETF seeks to match its portfolio to the S&P 500.
Fund returns track those of the underlying index, and costs are reduced
by eliminating much of the need for research and expertise in portfolio
construction (the “active” part of active management).
Passive investing is a huge trend. Fund houses launched over six
hundred new index funds in 2017 and added $223 billion in net cash flows
to index mutual funds. 48 The trend continued in 2018 with $207 billion
of new money in passive U.S. funds ($174 billion of which came out of
active funds). 49 Market experts predicted the passive market would
exceed actively managed funds by 2024, but it happened in September
45 Mozaffar Khan et al., Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence on Materiality, 91 ACCT. REV.
1697, 1716 (2016).
46 Friede et al., supra note 43, at 212.
47 See Jill E. Fisch et al., The New Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive
Investors, 168 U. PENN. L. REV. 17, 30 (2019). Professors Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon
describe passive strategies as exploding to “the point where there are now more indexes than
publicly traded U.S. stocks.” Id. at 31. In addition to tracking indices, passive strategies may convert
traditional active investment into a rules-based approach, or strategies that combine eighty percent
passive with twenty percent active strategies. See id. The proliferation of passive and passive-like
strategies dilutes the concept beyond the point of a singular definition or consensus. See id.
48 See
INV. CO. INST., 2018 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 75–76 (2018),
https://www.ici.org/pdf/2018_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/AT5E-GW4F].
49 Morningstar Reports U.S. Mutual Fund and ETF Asset Flows for Full-Year and December
2018, MORNINGSTAR (Jan. 17, 2019), https://newsroom.morningstar.com/newsroom/newsarchive/press-release-details/2019/Morningstar-Reports-US-Mutual-Fund-and-ETF-AssetFlows-for-Full-Year-and-December-2018/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/DS8Y-VY4M].
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2019. 50 Recently, passive funds capture seventy percent of new money in
markets. 51 Passive ESG funds coming online track fledgling indices of
leading ESG companies, offering investors a lower-cost and seemingly
less risky alternative to active management while still pursuing ESG
excellence. As noted above, they now compose nearly a third of the
sustainable funds market. 52
Exchange-traded funds—ETFs—are a passive investment product
permutation with shares, as the name suggests, traded on an exchange.53
Trading fund shares on an exchange allows for price fluctuations and
trading throughout the day, as compared to the end of day pricing and
trade clearing with traditional mutual funds. Many, but not all, ETFs
track an index. 54 The Investment Company Institute (ICI) valued the
2019 U.S. ETF market at $4.4 trillion in assets comprising sixteen percent
of net investment company assets. 55 The ETF market is highly

50 See, e.g., Trevor Hunnicutt, Index Funds to Surpass Active Fund Assets in U.S. by 2024:
Moody’s, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2017, 9:31 AM) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-fundspassive/index-funds-to-surpass-active-fund-assets-in-u-s-by-2024-moodys-idUSKBN15H1PN
[https://perma.cc/L3B7-XBEV]; John Gittelsohn, End of Era: Passive Equity Funds Surpass Active
in Epic Shift, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 11, 2019, 11:21 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2019-09-11/passive-u-s-equity-funds-eclipse-active-in-epic-industry-shift
[https://perma.cc/
6FPU-8XA5].
51 See MORNINGSTAR, U.S. FUND FEE STUDY (2018), https://www.morningstar.com/lp/annualus-fund-fee-study; see also INV. CO. INST., supra note 48, at 41.
52 See MORNINGSTAR, supra note 3, at 8.
53 See
SEC, INVESTOR BULLETIN: EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS (ETFS) 1 (2012),
https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/etfs.pdf [https://perma.cc/HJH3-L9L2]. Another key feature of
ETFs is that the trading price of fund shares fluctuates throughout the day, as opposed to once-aday priced NAV for traditional mutual funds. See id. at 2. The trading price of an ETF share may
be above or below the NAV for the underlying fund assets. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 48, at 85.
54 See INV. CO. INST., supra note 48, at 87–88. Index-based ETFs use several methods such as
(1) index plus tracking of index through market capitalization, (2) benchmarking using additional
factors like sales or book value, and (3) factor-based metrics that include screening indexes,
weighting, and further customization to achieve various investment strategies (diversification, low
volatility, market alignment or variation, etc.). See id.
55 INV. CO. INST., 2020 Investment Company Fact Book 83 (2020), https://www.ici.org/pdf/
2020_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/QPG3-33S5] (valuing the ETF market at $4.4 trillion year end
2019); INV. CO. INST., supra note 48, at 86 (stating a similar valuation for 2017); see also M.
Szmigiera, Total Net Assets of Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) in the United States from 2002 to 2018,
STATISTA (May 10, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/295632/etf-us-net-assets
[https://perma.cc/6G6M-KR3G].
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concentrated. 56 In November 2018, iShares ETF funds experienced the
highest monthly inflows out of the entire ETF market with $25.3 billion
of new investment dollars. 57 Two of iShares’ ESG-focused funds (iShares
Core MSCI Emerging Markets and iShares Edge MSCI Minimum
Volatility) contributed the strongest inflows. 58 Other ETF providers are
likewise generating new ESG ETF offerings.
Specially crafted ESG indices are the backbone of passive ESG funds.
For example, along with its negative screen, the Vanguard FTSE Social
Index relies on an index developed by FTSE that “is market-capitalization
weighted and includes primarily large- and mid-cap U.S. stocks that have
been screened for certain criteria related to the environment, human
rights, health and safety, labor standards, and diversity.” 59 Indices created
by MSCI are also quite popular. For example, the iShares MSCI USA ESG
Select ETF tracks MSCI’s USA Extended ESG Select Index, “which is an
optimized index designed to maximize exposure to favorable
environmental, social and governance (‘ESG’) characteristics, while
exhibiting risk and return characteristics similar to the MSCI USA
Index.” 60 Interestingly, ESG indices can also include negative screens of
their own. For example, the MSCI Index used to compose the iShares
MSCI KLD 400 Social ETF specifically excludes companies with
“significant involvement” in “alcohol, tobacco, gambling, civilian
firearms, nuclear power, controversial weapons, nuclear weapons,

56 See Socially Responsible ETF Overview, ETF.COM, https://www.etf.com/channels/sociallyresponsible [https://perma.cc/72AG-C3NK] (reporting AUM in the ninety-seven socially
responsible ETFs trading in U.S. markets and showing eleven of the largest twenty are offered by
ishares, as well as a domintaing presence by Vanguard and Invesco).
57 See Morningstar Reports U.S. Mutual Fund and ETF Asset Flows for November 2018,
MORNINGSTAR (Dec. 21, 2018), https://shareholders.morningstar.com/newsroom/news-archive/
press-release-details/2018/Morningstar-Reports-US-Mutual-Fund-and-ETF-Asset-Flows-forNovember-2018/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/GLN5-J933].
58 See id. The iShares 1-3 Year Treasury Bond, a non-ESG fund, is the third named fund
contributing to the strong monthly inflows. See id. For more current figures on fund flows, see
MORNINGSTAR, MORNINGSTAR U.S. FUND FLOWS: MODEST FLOW BOUNCE FOR U.S. STOCKS (2019)
https://www.morningstar.com/content/dam/marketing/shared/pdfs/Research/Direct_Fund_
Flows_Sep_2019_Final.pdf?cid=EMQ_&utm_source=eloqua&utm_medium=email&utm_
campaign=&utm_content=19262 [https://perma.cc/8CXP-GX2D].
59 Vanguard FTSE Soc. Index Fund, supra note 27.
60 iShares MSCI USA ESG Select ETF, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Aug. 31, 2018).
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conventional weapons, adult entertainment and genetically modified
organisms.” 61
ESG indexed mutual funds and ETFs claim to combine two of the
most powerful trends in investing: passive strategies and ESG. For
investors looking for low-cost, guilt-free saving or wealth-building
vehicles, they would seem the perfect solution. Further, with a reliable
ESG index, fund houses can harness the return-enhancing value of ESG
factors at manageable and marketable costs. But concerns about whether
ESG investing can deliver on its tremendous promise, particularly in its
low-regulation environment, persist in passive investing.
Passive vehicles’ reliance on indexing also introduces unique issues
regarding index creation and utilization. In an index fund, it becomes
important to consider how closely the fund actually tracks its accepted
index. As portfolios deviate from the index, certainty about the fund’s
ESG performance—at least as measured by the index selected—
diminishes. This role for index providers can make them immensely
powerful, but they are also intensely private. 62 Inserting index providers
into the ESG investment process increases its complexity and opacity for
investors. These features of passive ESG funds make them a fascinating
addition to the canvass as we unpack the challenges to realizing the goals
of ESG investment.
C.

Our Study

The literature on ESG investing combined with the fast-paced,
multifaceted growth of the practice suggests there will be great variation
in ESG investment products available on the market. Rather than react to
this mere likelihood of variation, we examined key attributes of thirtyone top ESG funds on the market, along with a select group of non-ESG
comparators in the same fund family. Our findings add specificity and
substance to the arguments we address.
iShares MSCI KLD 400 Soc. ETF, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Aug. 31, 2018).
Although metrics giant MSCI announced last year that it would make its ESG ratings publicly
available, the methods by which these ratings are generated remains private. See Hazel Bradford,
MSCI ESG Ratings Now Publicly Available, PENSIONS & INV. (Nov. 26, 2019, 2:22 PM),
https://www.pionline.com/esg/msci-esg-ratings-now-publicly-available [https://perma.cc/JJ56JHWS].
61
62
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Our study contained three distinct groups: ESG Funds, ESG Passive
Funds (index and ETF, collectively ESGP), and non-ESG Comparison
Funds. 63 To generate our list 64 of the “top” ESG funds, we combined 2017
AUM 65 with 2017 annual returns 66 and Morningstar sustainability
ratings. 67 This list captured three passive funds that we transferred to our
ESGP Funds list, leaving seventeen in our ESG Funds sample. To generate
the other eleven ESGP Funds, we used a Morningstar report of the top US
Passive Sustainable Funds, 68 which is also based on 2017 year-end data.
For our non-ESG Comparison Funds, we researched the fund families in
our ESG Funds and ESGP Funds samples to identify a similar asset-class
mutual fund or ETF product without an ESG component. There are seven
funds in our non-ESG Comparison Funds sample. Appendix I lists the
funds we review in this Article.
To investigate how ESG is being operationalized, our study observed
and compared five key attributes of the funds in our samples. We
reviewed the ESG and ESGP Funds’ investment strategy disclosures to
identify how and how thoroughly these funds describe their ESG
investment approaches. We compared fund fees across the ESG and
ESGP Fund samples, and in comparison to industry standard fees, 69 to
determine how inclusion of ESG considerations impacts the cost of
investing. Fund portfolio holdings and voting records on ESG
shareholder proposals provided insights on distinctiveness. Do ESG and
ESGP Funds invest in different portfolio companies than non-ESG
funds? Are they more willing to oppose management in support of
shareholder proposals geared toward enhancing portfolio company ESG
See infra Appendix I.
There is not widespread consensus of the “top” ESG funds because it depends on preference
for type of ESG impact, how to define ESG, and how to balance with financial returns. After
exhausting our research skills in trying to unearth a pre-existing list, we opted to compile our own.
65 See MORNINGSTAR, supra note 3.
66 Id.
67 Id.; see also Morningstar Sustainability Rating, MORNINGSTAR (Aug. 24, 2016),
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/745467/morningstar-sustainability-rating.html
[https://perma.cc/58FW-8UFH] (explaining Morningstar’s sustainability ratings).
68 See MORNINGSTAR, PASSIVE SUSTAINABLE FUNDS, supra note 35, at 16.
69 We use the market average here instead of a direct comparison to our non-ESG Comparison
Funds primarily because of the small size (seven) of this sample. In addition, the inclusion of
emerging market funds in the non-ESG Comparison sample would distort the fee comparison point
we want to make here, which is that ESG-branded products impose additional fees. From this point,
we hope to explore and prompt readers to consider when that fee is worth it.
63
64
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performance? Finally, we considered the tracking errors posted by ESGP
Funds. Tracking error reveals the difference between the composition of
a passively managed mutual fund or ETF and the underlying index
against which it is constructed. As ESGP Funds are constructed against
indices of high-performing ESG companies, larger tracking errors
indicate alternative (lesser? greater?) ESG performance, with other
consequences.
We collected our data primarily from fund disclosures available on
EDGAR after filing with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC),
including the Form 497K Summary Prospectus, which discloses funds’
investment strategies and risks, Form N-CSR, which reports fund
holdings, and Form N-PX, which reports fund votes. We also make use
of fund websites and publicly available mutual fund data compiled by
financial data websites such as Morningstar. Given our small sample size,
our data points are illustrative and not conclusively descriptive of the
entire ESG market. We provide our data with the intent to contextualize
the conversation. Our results and analysis appear below.
1.

Investment Strategies

As a first cut, investors must determine whether an investment’s
combination of ESG strategy, ESG performance, financial return, and
cost is suitable for them. While this is a familiar task for all investors—to
pick the asset best suited to your risk tolerance and financial needs—the
burden of the task is increased under the ESG mantle. Typical research
tools include the summary (or full) prospectus, fund website, third party
financial sites like Morningstar, or materials provided through an
employer-sponsored defined contribution plan. Traditional investors
spend little time with these materials, but perhaps ESG investors are more
motivated.
Unfortunately, even the most motivated of investors will struggle to
unpack what ESG means for a particular fund in a meaningful way. ESG
funds’ investment strategy statements are a little longer than non-ESG
funds (by approximately eighty words), especially with ESGP funds (over
two hundred additional words on average) likely accounting for the
additional ESG discussion. This promising finding reveals little in terms
of substance, however. ESG investment strategy statements vary widely
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from silence, to generic, 70 to moderate 71 and specific statements. For
example, the JP Morgan Emerging Markets Equity A 2018 filing
investment strategy statement contains no ESG-specific disclosure. 72 In
the 608-word investment description, zero are devoted to describing how
it is an ESG fund. The Neuberger Berman Socially Responsible
Investment fund provides an example of a specific disclosure, with over
seventy percent of the entire disclosure devoted to ESG. It states:
[T]he Portfolio Managers look for those [portfolio companies]
that show leadership in environmental, social and governance
considerations, including progressive workplace practices and
community relations. In addition, the Portfolio Managers
typically look at a company’s record in public health and the
nature of its products. The Portfolio Managers judge firms on
their corporate citizenship overall, considering their
accomplishments as well as their goals. While these judgments
are inevitably subjective, the Fund endeavors to avoid
companies that derive revenue from gambling or the production
of alcohol, tobacco, weapons, or nuclear power. The Fund also
does not invest in any company that derives its total revenue
primarily from non-consumer sales to the military. Please see
the Statement of Additional Information for a detailed
description of the Fund’s ESG criteria. Although the Fund

70 See e.g., Vanguard FTSE Soc. Index Fund, supra note 27 (including in its disclosed
investment strategy that “[t]he Index is market-capitalization weighted and includes primarily
large- and mid-cap U.S. stocks that have been screened for certain criteria related to the
environment, human rights, health and safety, labor standards, and diversity”).
71 See e.g., iShares MSCI KLD 400 Soc. ETF, supra note 61 (“[M]arket capitalization index
designed to target U.S. companies that have positive environmental, social and governance (‘ESG’)
characteristics. As of April 30, 2018, the Underlying Index consisted of 403 companies identified
by MSCI Inc. (the ‘Index Provider’ or ‘MSCI’) . . . . MSCI analyzes each eligible company’s ESG
performance using proprietary ratings covering ESG criteria. Companies that MSCI determines
have significant involvement in the following businesses are not eligible for the Underlying Index:
alcohol, tobacco, gambling, civilian firearms, nuclear power, controversial weapons, nuclear
weapons, conventional weapons, adult entertainment and genetically modified organisms.”).
72 JPMorgan Emerging Mkts. Equity Fund, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Mar. 1, 2018).
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invests primarily in domestic stocks, it may also invest in stocks
of foreign companies . . . . 73
In the middle of the two extremes are generic and moderate
statements of ESG commitment. The Parnassus Endeavor Investor
disclosure exemplifies a generic statement, providing that “The Adviser
also takes environmental, social and governance (‘ESG’) factors into
account in making investment decisions.” 74 TIAA-CREF Social Choice
Equity Institutional offers an example of a moderate ESG disclosure
describing specific attributes of the environmental (E), social (S), and
governance (G) factors contributing to portfolio selection. 75
Examining the ESGP Funds sample, we find a similar range of
silence to specific disclosure types. In the 2018 sample, one fund was
silent, devoting zero words in its statement of investment strategy to
describe its ESG specific investment approach, but that fund in 2019
changed it to a generic discussion of ESG considerations. Praxis funds in
the same family include identical disclosures of the fund family’s ESG
strategy. Such boilerplate provides some ESG information but does little
to distinguish the different ESG strategies offered between the Praxis
funds for consumers looking to understand their range of ESG
investment options. With other fund families, like iShares, we observe
variation between the strategy disclosures of different passive ESG funds
within the family. For example, the iShares MSCI ACWI Low Carbon
Target ETF 497K disclosure defines two dimensions of carbon exposure
(“carbon emissions and potential carbon emissions from fossil fuel
reserves”), describes carbon scoring, identifies the underlying index
(MSCI), and further explains the portfolio construction. 76 The strategy
disclosed for iShares MSCI USA ESG Select ETF is also specific, but
specifically different, describing its use of “an optimized index designed
to maximize exposure to favorable environmental, social and governance

73 Neuberger Berman Equity Funds, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Mar. 29, 2018)
(containing 398 ESG words out of 562 total investment strategy words).
74 Parnassus Endeavor Fund, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (May 1, 2018) (containing
sixteen ESG words out of a 384-word investment strategy statement, therefore dedicating just 4.1%
of the investment strategy disclosure to ESG).
75 TIAA-CREF Soc. Choice Equity Fund, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Mar. 1, 2018)
(containing only seventy-seven ESG words out of a 668-word disclosure).
76 iShares MSCI ACWI Low Carbon Target ETF (Form 497K) (Nov. 29, 2018).
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(‘ESG’) characteristics, while exhibiting risk and return characteristics
similar to the MSCI USA Index” and further detailing the index’s
methodology. 77 Disclosures for both funds, across both years, caution
that the underlying index includes large- or mid-capitalized firms with
concentrations in the financial and technology sectors—statements that
come to life in our holdings data. 78 The Green Century MSCI
International Index Fund’s filing, another specific ESG disclosure,
likewise describes the underlying index composition utilized, as well as
the fund’s environmental focus on carbon exposure through fossil fuels,
and exclusionary screens applied to the portfolio. 79
ESG investment strategies and the disclosures describing those
strategies to investors vary significantly between funds. What is the harm
in an undefined and un-demarcated ESG scope? The vagueness and
variation in ESG funds empower fund managers. ESG fund strategy
statements can be broad and vague, committing to, for example,
“invest[] . . . in forward-thinking companies with more sustainable
business models” 80 or “employ[] a sustainable rating system based on its
own, as well as third-party, data to identify issuers believed to present low
risks in ESG.” 81
Beyond identifying the three qualifying attributes—“E,” “S,” and
“G”—when funds discuss ESG investing, they do so using different
definitions, qualifications, and metrics. TIAA-CREF’s dedicated ESG
fund describes ESG as follows:
The Fund’s investments are subject to certain ESG criteria. The
ESG criteria are implemented based on data provided by
independent research vendor(s). All companies must meet or
exceed minimum ESG performance standards to be eligible for
iShares MSCI USA ESG Select ETF, supra note 60.
iShares MSCI KLD 400 Social ETF, supra note 61 (“[M]arket capitalization index designed
to target U.S. companies that have positive environmental, social and governance (‘ESG’)
characteristics. As of April 30, 2018, the Underlying Index consisted of 403 companies identified
by MSCI Inc. (the ‘Index Provider’ or ‘MSCI’) . . . . MSCI analyzes each eligible company’s ESG
performance using proprietary ratings covering ESG criteria. Companies that MSCI determines
have significant involvement in the following businesses are not eligible for the Underlying Index:
alcohol, tobacco, gambling, civilian firearms, nuclear power, controversial weapons, nuclear
weapons, conventional weapons, adult entertainment and genetically modified organisms.”).
79 Green Century Funds, Statement of Additional Information (Form 497K) (May 15, 2017).
80 Pax World Funds Series Tr. I, Registration Statement (Form 485A) (Feb. 1, 2018).
81 Amana Income Fund, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Sept. 28, 2018).
77
78
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inclusion in the Fund. The evaluation process favors companies
with leadership in ESG performance relative to their peers.
Typically, environmental assessment categories include climate
change, natural resource use, waste management and
environmental opportunities. Social evaluation categories
include human capital, product safety and social opportunities.
Governance assessment categories include corporate
governance, business ethics and government and public policy.
How well companies adhere to international norms and
principles and involvement in major ESG controversies
(examples of which may relate to the environment, customers,
human rights and community, labor rights and supply chain,
and governance) are other considerations.
The ESG evaluation process is conducted on an industryspecific basis and involves the identification of key performance
indicators, which are given more or less relative weight
compared to the broader range of potential assessment
categories. Concerns in one area do not automatically eliminate
an issuer from being an eligible Fund investment. When ESG
concerns exist, the evaluation process gives careful
consideration to how companies address the risks and
opportunities they face in the context of their sector or industry
and relative to their peers. The Fund will not generally invest in
companies significantly involved in certain business activities,
including but not limited to the production of alcohol, tobacco,
military weapons, firearms, nuclear power and gambling
products and services. 82
Even this extensive discussion leaves many open questions to the
fund manager and its delegates. How far superior to a company’s peers
must its performance be to constitute “leadership”? It appears that no
minimum level of E, S, or G performance is required; how does leadership
in one arena compensate for poor performance in another? When, and
on what basis, will the negative screen be ignored? Of course, part of the
value of investing in a fund is relying on an expert’s wisdom and expertise.
Adding ESG issues to this domain, however, broadens this reliance and
82

2018).

TIAA-CREF Social Choice Intl. Equity Fund, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Mar. 1,
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increases fund managers’ power, not only over investment and
engagement decisions made on this basis, but also potentially over the
attention and priority given to ESG issues (and ESG issues each
independently) by portfolio companies. As these players motivated by
financial return create demand for ESG metrics (or produce them inhouse), these metrics will also be developed to identify return-protecting
and palatable companies, but not necessarily transformative change.
Even when funds share a passive ESG strategy, a seeming niche of
the market with considerable overlap, substantial variation persists.
Because an ESG label does not represent a clear investment strategy, even
when associated with passive funds, it primarily serves a branding
function for the investing public. The market signal that a fund is “ESG”
seems to be more about the normative “good” an investment can provide
rather than signal how the investment works or the degree to which a
fund even pursues ESG. A useful analogy may be to a fictional fund calling
itself a “success” fund (something funds are not allowed to do). Investors
may be drawn to the label and idea of success without having a clear
understanding of why the fund may or may not achieve investment
success. Market signals of this sort increase the burden on the investing
public to decode the labels and differentiate the investment products
offered.
In short, the ESG investment market now designs products with a
range of investment strategies, varying levels of commitment to ESG, and
fluid definitional boundaries around what counts as ESG. Important
questions about how a fund operationalizes ESG remain after this review.
The opacity of the ESG investment market imposes a significant burden
on investors to distinguish between ESG investments and match their
preferences to the appropriate ESG strategy and outcome (for them)
within the range of options. With opacity comes unchallenged leeway for
managers and index providers, all shielded from public review.
2.

Fees

Cost is a key consideration in both choosing and designing
investment products. Investors select products with fees they are willing
to pay, and fund creators design products with fees that will make them
competitive, yet profitable. Lower fees have been a tremendous force in
the investment market, driving the rise of passive investing. Applying an
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ESG lens necessarily introduces additional costs into portfolio
construction. In active funds, managers must research and evaluate the
ESG performance of potential portfolio companies and continue to assess
them over time. In passive ESG funds, managers must purchase access to
an index from an outside firm or dedicate resources to developing an
index or rules-based model of their own. The cost of these extra burdens
is likely passed along to ESG investors in the form of higher fees.
Our sample shows a range of fees associated with ESG investment
products. 83 The average expense ratio is 1.09, but with a widely divergent
range of fees from 0.18 (TIAA-Cref Social Choice Equity fund) to 1.47
(Domini Impact International fund). The range of fees for passive ESG
funds also varied considerably with a low of 0.19 in the Calvert US Large
Cap Core Responsible Index and the highs around 1.30 for funds targeted
on international markets (Praxis International Index at 1.32) or specific
sectors (Calvert Global Water at 1.28). The greatly reduced cost of
executing passive strategies compared to active strategies, which require
individual portfolio asset oversight and monitoring, account for the
different fees. 84 Consider average mutual fund fees of 0.51–0.59 for all
mutual funds compared to 0.09 for index equity funds. 85 Our ESGP
Funds average lower fees (0.68) than the active ESG Funds sample (1.09
fees), but not this low. Table 2 below reports fees in our review of ESG
and ESGP Funds.

Data supporting this paragraph is listed in Table 2.
See, e.g., Dana Anspach, How Mutual Fund Expense Ratios Work, BALANCE (Dec. 3, 2019),
https://www.thebalance.com/expense-ratios-paying-much-2388663
[https://perma.cc/7FLLME35].
85 See INV. CO. INST., supra note 48, at 118, 123. A Morningstar report on 2017 fees based on a
sample of 25,000 funds found the average expense ratio to be .52%. See MORNINGSTAR, supra note
51, at 1. Investor fund flows into lower-fee fund options, like indexes, drive average fees down. See
id. at 7–8.
83
84

2020]

BUYER BEWARE

1947

Table 2: 2018 ESG Fees 86

In addition to revealing considerable variation across all ESG funds,
we find ESGP Funds charge lower fees than those using active strategies,
but higher fees than average non-ESG index products. Recent
Morningstar research found similar results, reporting that while
sustainable funds are competitive on fees, sustainable ETFs fees tended to
be higher than average. 87 These findings undermine the low-fee value
86 This table reflects 2018 fees only. We reviewed 2019 fees and found consistent results that
the ESG funds are higher, on average, than non-ESG funds and that ESGP funds, while lower than
ESG active funds, are still higher than non-ESG traditional passive funds.
87 See MORNINGSTAR, supra note 3, at 27; see also MORNINGSTAR, PASSIVE SUSTAINABLE
FUNDS, supra note 35, at 1, 13, 18 (reporting findings that sustainable index funds in the United
States and Europe are more expensive than standard index products). Note that the fees reported
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proposition of passive strategies, but are easy to understand. Higher fees
in passive ESG investing are likely reflect the new and different metrics
on which ESG index products rely compared to traditional passive funds.
To obtain market-worthy metrics, mutual fund families integrating
ESG factors must invest in new personnel and expertise to create the
metrics in-house or secure metrics or index information from external
providers for a (presumably hefty) 88 price. MSCI, which supplies indices
for more of the ESG index funds in our sample than any other provider,
offers a “suite of over 1,000 equity and fixed income ESG
Indexes . . . designed to represent [the performance of] some of the most
prevalent ESG strategies.” 89 MSCI claims to “help institutional investors
more effectively benchmark to ESG investment performance well as
manage, measure and report on ESG mandates.”90 The Vanguard FTSE
Social Index Fund, the largest passive ESG fund with quadruple the assets
under management (four billion dollars) of any other fund in our sample,
in our paper are a small, nonrepresentative sample of the ESG market and thus may be skewed
higher as a result of the sample, inclusion of legacy sustainable funds, and different share class fees
being reported (although we took institutional share class numbers whenever available).
88 A 2017 report by Investment Week cites index fees ranging from £22,000–150,000 for the
licensing fees and use of data. See Tom Eckett & Anna Fedorova, Managers Reconsider Use of Index
Providers
amid
‘Eye-Watering’
Costs,
INV.
WEEK
(June
8,
2017),
https://www.investmentweek.co.uk/investment-week/news/3011594/managers-reconsider-useof-index-providers-amid-eye-watering-costs
[https://perma.cc/9NZ9-YXL6].
Given
the
proprietary nature of the ESG indices there is little concern, at least now, of stealth indexing where
active ESG funds mimic market-indexed funds and still charge a higher fee. See K.J. Martijn
Cremers & Quinn Curtis, Do Mutual Fund Investors Get What They Pay For? Securities Law and
Closet Index Funds, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 31 (2016) (describing the costs and legal consequences of
closet indexing).
89 ESG Investing, MSCI, https://www.msci.com/esg-integration [https://perma.cc/6Z2FUVJM]; see also MSCI, MSCI ESG MULTI-ASSET CLASS ANALYTICS 4 (2018),
https://www.msci.com/documents/1296102/11039838/MSCI+ESG+Analytics+Brochure.pdf/
e54eb02f-1c09-f394-3768-ec7a776f9973 [https://perma.cc/7QHK-X34D] (claiming MSCI is “the
world’s largest provider of ESG research and data”).
90 MSCI ESG Indexes, MSCI, https://www.msci.com/esg-indexes [https://perma.cc/HNT9KTQK]; MSCI, MSCI ESG SCREENED INDEXES: AN OFF-THE-SHELF APPROACH TO ESG SCREENS 3
(2019),
https://www.msci.com/documents/1296102/1636401/MSCI-ESG-Screened-IndexesBrochure.pdf/ff64b0bc-f06e-298b-f84b-95814f193ed4 [https://perma.cc/DC47-DD7Z] (boasting
that over $250 billion in institutional, retail, and ETF assets are benchmarked to MSCI ESG
Indexes). For a discussion of the concentration of the index industry and its resulting power, see
Johannes Petry et al., Steering Capital: The Growing Private Authority of Index Providers in the Age
of Passive Asset Management, REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 1 (2019), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
full/10.1080/09692290.2019.1699147 [https://perma.cc/B788-W9AZ].
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relies on the FTSE4Good US Select Index, a market-capitalization
weighted U.S. equity index that, as noted above, excludes “tobacco,
alcohol, adult entertainment, firearms, gambling, [and] nuclear power”
stocks. 91 The index is produced by FTSE Russell, a leading global provider
of indices that developed its first FTSE4Good Index products in 2001 and
now offers numerous suites of ESG indices, across various strategies and
asset classes. 92 As does MSCI, FTSE Russell also offers ESG benchmarking
and metrics products in addition to these proprietary indices.
At least with regard to some ESG products, fees diverge from market
norms. This imposes a burden on investors to investigate fees and decide
whether the blend of potential financial and non-financial returns from
ESG investments—which is itself difficult to discern and assess—is
sufficient to compensate them for higher costs. Further, as we document
more below, there may be tension between low fees and high ESG impact.
As large complexes, like iShares, continue to gain market share, there will
be increasing ESG fee pressure—a financial positive that may lessen ESG
impact. 93
3.

Portfolio Holdings

Here we examine the portfolio companies in which ESG funds
invest. The range of portfolio company holdings is consistent with the
range of investment styles (United States vs. international; specific
industry/sector vs. whole market, etc.) and the range of ESG commitment
reflected in investment strategies. That disclaimer aside, the holdings
reported in Appendix II may surprise even skeptics.

Vanguard FTSE Soc. Index Fund, supra note 27.
See FTSE RUSSELL, FTSE4GOOD INDEX SERIES 1 (2019), https://www.ftse.com/products/
downloads/FTSE4Good-brochure.pdf?_ga=2.193271214.2070678876.1550678839-407133334.
1550678839 [https://perma.cc/4BV8-MVX5] (describing origination and development of
FTSE4Good Index); FTSE ESG Index Series, FTSE RUSSEL, https://www.ftse.com/products/indices/
esg [https://perma.cc/5ZEV-CFJ2] (linking to information on the various ESG index series
available from the firm).
93 Gabriel Presler, Sustainable Funds U.S. Landscape: 5 Takeaways from Our 2018 Report,
MORNINGSTAR
(Feb.
19,
2019),
https://www.morningstar.com/blog/2019/02/19/esglandscape.html [https://perma.cc/X4ME-L66C] (“Behemoths like BlackRock and Vanguard bring
increasing fee pressure into an area that has historically been associated with higher costs.”).
91
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To explore portfolio holdings, we review the top holdings, as
measured by percent of fund assets invested in a company. 94 For
consistency and manageability, we capped all reported holdings at the top
ten portfolio companies. While this is a small subset of holdings for a
relatively small sample of funds, the information is still too diffuse and
granular to get a sense of what companies are included in ESG funds. To
focus our discussion, we researched each portfolio company and assigned
it one of the following broad categories:
•

•

•

•

•

Financial services: capital providers to individuals and
businesses, insurance companies, credit card companies,
and large financial institutions, such as Intercontinental
Exchange, Inc.
Technology and tech infrastructure companies: companies
that make integrated technology software, hardware, or
products including companies, such as Apple, Alphabet
(Google’s investment arm), Microsoft, Vodafone, AT&T,
etc.
Consumer products and services: companies making goods
or providing goods (including retail) for individual
consumption and use, such as Clorox, Hanes, Dollar
General, Starbucks, Amazon, Alibaba, PepsiCo Inc., WalMart, etc.
Pharmaceuticals and health: companies manufacturing over
the counter and prescription medicine for humans and
animals, medical device companies, and pharmacies, such as
Eli Lilly, Pfizer Inc., United Health Group, Inc., and CVS
Health Corp.
Other: companies focused on business operations, logistics,
small component parts, the automobile, railroad, and energy
industries, etc.

There are some companies for which the category assignment is
reasonably debatable, such as 3M Co., which is assigned as a consumer
product despite its wide range of operations. The category assignment
reflects our predilection for post-it notes rather than a balance sheet or
94 We report the top ten holdings of each fund in our sample, as reported in the fall of 2018.
Holdings are listed in Appendix II, infra. Raw data is on file with authors.
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operations analysis. Categorical assignments are intended to condense
disparate information into a digestible, although imperfect, snapshot of
the portfolio holdings for purposes of illustration, not causal analysis. The
categories also reflect, in part, our interest in household names, which
appeared repeatedly across both the four industry categories and the
“other” category, in which clear examples of household name companies
such as Walt Disney and Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. were common.
The following three charts report the distribution of the top ten
portfolio company holdings in our broad categories across our three
samples of funds in 2018–2019. This albeit rough view of portfolio
holdings gives us a sense of what markets/sectors these funds invest in,
allowing for rough comparisons of ESG fund portfolio construction to
non-ESG funds. Although our ESG Funds and ESGP Funds samples
reflect a wide range of ESG “commitments” and investment styles
(international, domestic, growth, large cap, etc.), assigning each portfolio
company to one of our broad categories yields industry distributions.
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ESG funds hold more finance companies—its top weighted
industry—than ESGP. Both ESG and ESGP heavily invest in the
technology and infrastructure sectors. Both have similar exposures to
consumer facing companies and pharmaceuticals or health care
companies.
The “other” category—captures the largest share of top ten portfolio
holdings in both ESGP Funds and non-ESG Comparison Funds sample.
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As a catchall by design, it is important to unpack the range of firms
included in this category to understand our findings. In reviewing the
constituent firms assigned to the “other” category across our samples, one
observation stands out. For non-ESG funds, the “other” category includes
a concentration of traditional energy industry players and automobile
manufacturers in the top ten holdings. In contrast, both company types
are conspicuously absent from the top ten portfolio holdings (but not all
holdings) of the ESG and ESGP Funds we studied. 95 If nothing else, ESG
investments on the aggregate appear to provide differential exposure, at
least in terms of depth, to the traditional energy and automobile sectors
than their non-ESG competitors. Otherwise, the composition of the nonESG Comparison funds looks similar to ESGP funds, with a greater
emphasis on pharmaceuticals and health care.
The other differences across the samples are less dramatic, but still
worthy of discussion. Some are likely driven largely by the group of ESG
funds that concentrate on a particular ESG theme or sector. For example,
in the ESGP Funds sample, the “other” category is largely comprised
(sixty-one percent) of portfolio companies held by sector/thematic ESG
funds focused on water, clean energy, etc., 96 and not held by non-ESG
Comparison funds. When looking at 2018 data alone, we also saw
differentiation on consumer services and products (more prevalent in
non-ESG Comparison funds), but those differences mostly fall away
when adding in 2019 data. Our sample included no funds built around an
explicit consumer products/services theme, but it is possible that
consumer-facing firms face especially significant pressure to engage in
corporate social responsibility efforts, allowing overrepresentation
among ESG fund portfolios. 97 ESG commitments can be a part of a brand
identity and marketing strategy just as quality or price can be.
95 For example, in 2019 iShares MSCI ACWI Low Carbon Target ETF held positions in oil
companies, automobile manufacturers, and tobacco companies in addition to the standard
financial and technology companies. See also Akane Otani, ESG Funds Enjoy Record Inflows, Still
Back Big Oil and Gas, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2019, 4:29 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/top-esgfunds-are-all-still-invested-in-oil-and-gas-companies-11573468200?mod=searchresults&page=
1&pos=1 [https://perma.cc/V9PQ-43ND].
96 There are no observable patterns driving the composition of the “other” category in our ESG
Funds sample, although it also includes thematic funds.
97 See N. Craig Smith, Consumers as Drivers of Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 281, 297–98 (Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008)
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Our review of portfolio holdings across all three samples also
revealed a strikingly consistent reliance on household name brand
companies. 98 All samples have at least a handful of funds where all top ten
holdings are household name brands. For example, in 2018, TIAA-CREF
Social Choice Equity fund was entirely comprised of household name
brands. As expected, the number is clearly higher in the non-ESG
Comparison funds. The percentages of portfolio holdings with mixed or
higher household name brand exposures is similar across the three
samples with the highest in the non-ESG Comparison (eighty-six
percent) and lowest in ESGP (sixty-five percent) and ESG in the middle
(seventy-five percent).

(arguing that consumers are likely less important drivers of CSR among business-to-business
firms).
98 We defined household name brand in light of our subjective evaluation of a company’s
status. As noted above, we researched each portfolio company, and in that way possibly skewed our
perception.
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Table 3 provides readers with some instructive examples drawn
from our household name brand analysis. It reports the household name
companies in each category described above (aside from “other”)
appearing among the top ten holdings of funds in our ESGP Funds
sample. Numbers indicate totals; sample firms are listed in the second
row, noting companies held by multiple funds. Household name brand
holdings were consistent in 2018 and 2019. For readers seeking still
greater detail, Appendix II lists the top ten portfolio company holdings
(2018) for our entire sample: ESG Funds, ESGP Funds, and non-ESG
Comparison Funds.
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Table 3: Review of Top 10 2018 & 2019 “Household Name”
Holdings of ESGP Funds Sample
36 Banking &
Finance

51 Technology
&
Infrastructure

43 Consumer
Goods/Services

18
Pharma/Health
Care

10 Banks (6
Bank of
America)
7 JP Morgan
12 Credit
Cards
(Mastercard5; Visa-7)
3 Citigroup
3 Blackrock
2 Insurance
(Allianz)

10 Apple Inc.
17 Alphabet
Inc. 99
11 Microsoft
6 Facebook
4 Intel (3); IBM
(1)
4 Telecom (2
AT&T; 2
Verizon)
1 Salesforce

6 Amazon. com
8 Proctor &
Gamble
6 Johnson &
Johnson
2 Walmart
2 Alibaba
3 Soda (2 Pepsi;
1 Coke)
2 Nestle
6 Other

Proctor Gamble
Merck & Co
3 Pfizer
2 Roche
3 UnitedHealth
Care
GlaxcoSmithKline
3 Other

We make no normative judgment about the inclusion of household
name brands in a fund as a good indicator of ESG commitment or not,
nor of the underlying merits of these portfolio companies’ performance
on E, S, or G metrics. 100 Our observation instead is that, outside of
thematic ESG funds such as those focusing on clean energy or water, 101
there is little to distinguish between ESG branded funds and non-ESG
branded funds with regard to recognizable ESG quality of their top
portfolio companies. A simple specialist/generalist dichotomy may help
explain the varied focus on name brand portfolio companies. Of the funds
99 Many funds, such as iShares MSCI ACWI Low Carbon Target ETF held two different classes
of Alphabet stock (class A and C) among its top ten holdings, which were counted twice. Infra
Appendix II.
100 Given the breadth of ESG implementation approaches, including integration of ESG risks
and opportunities in decision making, the portfolios of ESG and non-ESG funds unsurprisingly
overlap, especially as ESG integration is viewed as a tool of risk mitigation and return protection.
See e.g., MORNINGSTAR, BETTER MINUS WORSE: EVALUATING ESG EFFECTS ON RISK AND RETURN
(2020),
https://www.morningstar.com/lp/esg-as-a-factor
[https://perma.cc/Y6DH-DT6C]
(reporting on the effects of ESG holdings in portfolio risk exposure and returns).
101 Passive ESG funds with a thematic focus, such as Calvert Global Water and Guggenheim
Solar ETF funds, are comprised exclusively of companies outside of the mainstream. As noted
earlier, all of these funds’ portfolio companies also fall into the “other” category, reflecting the
overlap between the industry categories and the name brand distinction. Infra Appendix II.
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that have mixed or low recognition, they are primarily sector-based ESG
funds and international or emerging market-focused funds. The same is
true of non-ESG fund holdings.
In this Section and as further documented in Appendix II, we
observe mainstream investments and overlapping investments in
particular portfolio companies such as Apple, Alphabet, Amazon, Bank
of America, Facebook, and Microsoft, by funds in all three sample groups.
These observations alone are not damning as to ESG commitment; we
make no claim as to the ESG performance of the portfolio companies. We
note the prevalence of mainstream investments in light of the range of
disclosed ESG criteria and investment strategies. An investor looking to
invest in a “good” ESG fund will struggle to distinguish between products
based on the disclosures and on the top holdings when the ESG criteria
are hard to discern and the holdings concentrated in mainstream
companies.
Investors are responsible for understanding both the risk and the
opportunity of any investment. Our observations raise questions about
ESG market efficiency, however, when the information required to
distinguish and assess various investment products is diffuse,
disaggregated, and hard to interpret. Information asymmetry of this kind
impedes ESG labels from carrying substantive information to investors,
relegating its value again to branding and market signaling rather than
investor education.
4.

Voting

Voting patterns are another way to unpack the range of ESG options
from which investors can choose. Voting is particularly important in
passive funds for which purchases and sales are constrained by the need
to track an underlying index. While shareholder engagement comprises
informal attempts to influence portfolio company management,
advancing shareholder proposals, and voting on both shareholder
proposals and other matters raised by management, not all of these are
transparent and frequently relevant to ESG investing. We therefore focus
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on votes on shareholder proposals, many of which address ESG issues, 102
and for which fund voting records are publicly disclosed.
Despite the availability of mutual fund and ETF votes, developing a
sense of funds’ voting activity is daunting. Funds file voting disclosures
in text form, using various formats, and often running hundreds of pages.
Searching is made more difficult by the common practice of including
votes by multiple, similarly named funds in the same document. We
amassed just two years (2018 and 2019) of data on our thirty-one funds, 103
and it required searching thousands of lines of disclosures by hand.
Occasionally, this task was further complicated by vague descriptions of
proposals on which funds vote. In the most striking example we
encountered, the Amana Growth Fund 2019 disclosure lists merely
“[c]onsider and vote upon one stockholder proposal” at Adobe annual
meeting, reporting its vote against the proposal. 104 Only through review
of another fund’s description of votes at the same Adobe meeting were
we able to discern the proposal in question concerned a report on the
gender pay gap. The data we report below emerge from this arduous, but
imperfect, process and should be understood as such.
Our review of the 2018 and 2019 voting records disclosed by funds
in each of our three sample groups on ESG-related shareholder proposals
generated results broadly aligned with our sense that investors get the
ESG they are willing to pay for. Funds offered by large, generalist fund
complexes were the only ones to consistently clash with ESG
expectations. Vanguard’s FTSE Social Index fund posted perhaps the
102 See, e.g., ROBERT KALB ET AL., ISS ANALYTICS, A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE 2018 US
PROXY SEASON 4–6 (2018), https://www.isscorporatesolutions.com/file/documents/ics_a_
preliminary_review_of_the_2018_us_proxy_season.pdf?elqTrackId=8bd378d423324ecdb189
187cc8f09cb1&elq=e1fa6417035a49dea20d5c16f66c81d5&elqaid=969&elqat=1&elqCampaignId=
[https://perma.cc/6VB8-URNG] (reviewing the 2018 proxy season, including ESG proposals as
major components).
103 The voting records are taken from Forms N-PX filed with the SEC in 2018 and 2019,
reporting funds’ votes cast during the 2018 and 2019 proxy seasons. We focused on votes in the top
holdings assuming that funds may not have resources to devote to monitoring all proxy issues at all
companies in which the fund invests, but also assuming that scarce proxy resources would be
devoted to monitoring votes at companies topping funds’ holdings lists. In addition to examining
all votes at top portfolio companies, we analyzed every vote reported by each fund on three
indicative categories of ESG issues as noted in Table 4, infra.
104 Amana Mut. Funds Tr., Annual Report of Proxy Voting Record of Registered Management
Investment Company (Form N-PX) (June 30, 2019).
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most surprising voting history, opposing every shareholder proposal
recommending climate change reporting and against dozens of proposals
on gender pay equity, employee diversity reports and policies, and
political spending disclosure. 105 The Hartford Schroders Emerging
Market Equity Fund was also quite negative on the ESG issues it
confronted. In 2018, it voted against two proposals on climate change,
posted a mix of yes, no, and abstention votes on various diversity and
gender pay equity proposals, and voted against five proposals to report
on political spending. The three iShares ETFs in our sample, managed by
passive investing giant BlackRock, seemed to shift their voting
perspectives over the two years in our sample. While they had supported
many shareholder proposals on climate change, gender pay/diversity, and
political spending the prior year, the iShares ETFs in our ESGP sample
voted against nearly all ESG proposals they faced in 2019.
In contrast, funds offered by specialized ESG fund creators voted
fairly consistently in favor of shareholder proposals geared toward
enhancing portfolio company ESG performance. For example, the MidCap fund offered by Parnassus Investments, a firm that declares itself the
“[l]argest pure play ESG fund company” 106 supported a proposal to
include sustainability as a performance measure for senior executive
compensation at Alphabet/Google. It likewise opposed management on
ESG issues across both years and various holdings, voting in favor of
proposals on gender pay equity, adoption of a board diversity policy,
human rights, reporting on political spending, forced labor in the supply
chain, and greenhouse gas emissions. The PAX MSCI EAFE ESG Leaders
Index Fund, a passive product offered by ESG-specialist Pax World

105 For analogous findings of mismatch across the Big Three’s voting records on stock buybacks
and M&A, despite the claimed long-term orientation of these fund families, see Jan Fichtner &
Eelke M. Heemskerk, The New Permanent Universal Owners: Index Funds, (Im)patient Capital, and
the Claim of Long-Termism 17–30 (CorpNet, Working Paper, 2018), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3321597 [https://perma.cc/6J3X-NVRQ]; see also Ross Kerber & Tim McLaughlin, Biggest
U.S. Index Funds Oppose Most Climate Proposals in Shareholder Votes, REUTERS (Oct. 8, 2019, 6:05
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-funds-index-climatechange/biggest-u-s-indexfunds-oppose-most-climate-proposals-in-shareholder-votes-idUSKBN1WN105
[https://perma.cc/ZM3L-UMQ2] (reporting widespread voting against climate change proposals
by large U.S. index funds).
106 Who We Are, PARNASSUS INV., https://www.parnassus.com/who-we-are [https://perma.cc/
2MHQ-LYX3].
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Funds, 107 also consistently voted in favor of climate change and
gender/diversity-focused proposals, as well as proposals to curb
corporate political donations. It even opposed management proposals
seeking European Union (EU)-required approval of political donations
and expenditures many times over. Such proposals were extremely
common in the two years we studied, and PAX funds posted among the
very few votes ever to oppose them.
A simple specialist/generalist dichotomy alone does not explain all
the variation we observe, however. Longstanding sustainable investing
specialist Calvert 108 posted a mixed record. Calvert opposed management
and voted in favor of several proposals for reports on gender pay and
diversity across its holdings. Its Equity A fund supported greenhouse gas
emission reporting and its US Large Cap Core Responsible Index Fund
supported both the Alphabet/Google proposal to include sustainability as
a performance measure in executive compensation and a proposal to
establish a human rights board committee at Apple. But the Calvert US
Large Cap Core Responsible Fund also voted against four climate change
proposals.
At times, even the more consistent niche players split votes on ESG
proposals addressing related topics. For example, Neuberger Berman’s 109
Socially Responsible Fund voted in favor of all but one of a 2018 series of
environmental proposals at Kroger. It supported proposals on renewable
energy and deforestation and the supply chain but voted against a
proposal to report on environmental impacts of the company’s continued
use of non-recyclable packaging. 110 In 2019, the Endeavor Fund offered
by specialist Parnassus split its votes on diversity issues; it supported
107 See About Pax, PAX WORLD FUNDS, https://paxworld.com/about [https://perma.cc/K8UG4BPL] (“[W]e offer a diverse lineup of investment strategies focused on the investment risks and
opportunities associated with the transition to a more sustainable global economy.”).
108 See CALVERT, https://www.calvert.com [https://perma.cc/5Q4B-M6M6] (“Calvert has been
at the forefront of ESG investing for decades . . . .”).
109 The Neuberger Berman states that “[a]cross our investment platform, Neuberger Berman
looks for opportunities to engage on ESG issues and trends, and to support clients to increase the
impact of their investments.” Who We Are, NEUBERGER BERMAN, https://www.nb.com/en/global/
who-we-are [https://perma.cc/XV86-MCT9].
110 Neuberger Berman Nationwide Variable Insurance Trust, Annual Report of Proxy Voting
Record of Nationwide Variable Insurance Trust (Form N-PX) (Aug. 20, 2018). The Fund also
supported an ESG reporting proposal, multiple lobbying reporting proposals, and gender pay gap
risk reporting. See id.
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several gender pay gap proposals but opposed two concerning board
diversity.
Table 4 reports 2019 votes by funds in our three samples on three
types of shareholder proposals that raise ESG issues. 111 Note that it
tabulates fund votes only on climate change and sustainability
(environmental), gender pay and diversity (social), and political spending
(governance)112 proposals. 113 Of course, the sample funds confronted and
voted on many other types of ESG proposals beyond the types Table 4
reports. Many faced votes on lobbying reporting, human rights issues,
data privacy, changes to voting procedures, and independent board chair
requirements. Representing the full range of proposals in a
comprehensible format proved difficult, so we confine Table 4 to these
three types of issues to provide an accessible snapshot of our results.
Various other votes are highlighted in the discussion above and the
analysis of potential explanations for the results that follows Table 4.

111 Some of these votes may have been registered on proposals ultimately withdrawn by their
proponents after negotiation with management to address the underlying issues. Regardless, they
remain useful indicators of funds’ ESG commitments.
112 Views vary on whether other governance issues like independent board chair mandates or
voting rule changes will impact financial performance. As our goal was to track a “G” issue that
would align with investor perspectives on what is normatively good governance regardless of any
related bottom line effect, we chose political spending. Proposals seeking disclosure of political
spending seek greater transparency in pursuit of good governance, rather than performance
changes in the targeted firm.
113 A similar table reporting the 2018 votes appears in Appendix III, infra. As noted there, when
compiling the 2018 voting records, we searched only for proposals addressing climate change
specifically. We were disappointed this search yielded relatively little information. To draw in a
more representative “E” sample, for the 2019 data reported in Table 4, infra, we also include
proposals more broadly addressing issues of sustainability.
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Table 4: 2019 Voting Records
Climate
Gender
Political
Change/
Pay/Diversity Spending 114
Sustainability

Vanguard
FTSE Social
Index
Calvert US
Large Cap
Passive Core Resp
ESG
Index I
iShares MSCI
KLD 400
Social ETF
PowerShares
Water
Resources
ETF 116
PAX MSCI
EAFE ESG
Leaders Index
Instl
iShares MSCI
USA ESG
Select ETF
Guggenheim
S&P Global
Water

4 against

23 against

29 against

split 18-2 115

split 23-5

24 for

split 2-11-4

split 1-29

split 1-21

0 proposals

0 proposals

split 1-1

8 for

0 proposals

0
proposals

2 against

split 1-19

11 against

0 proposals

0 proposals

1 for

114 Many of the funds in our sample voted on management proposals to authorize political
spending, per European regulations. As these were not shareholder proposals, we do not report
votes on them in Table 4. Other than the PAX opposition to these proposals, noted supra text
accompanying note 107, these proposals were widely supported across all three fund categories.
115 Split votes are reported in the format for-against unless the fund abstained, in which case
votes are reported in the format for-against-abstention.
116 Several funds in our sample faced no relevant votes on our selected environmental, social
and governance issues during our sample period. Indeed, some faced no ESG-related proposals at
all. Funds without reportable votes were primarily those dedicated to emerging market companies.
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iShares MSCI
ACWI Low
Carbon Target
ETF

split 2-4

split 1-27

split 1-23

Calvert Global
Water A

3 for

1 for

4 for

Guggenheim
Solar ETF

0 proposals

0 proposals

0
proposals

Green Century
MSCI
International
0 proposals
Index Fund Institution

0 proposals

0
proposals

Praxis Growth
Index Fund

split 7-1

split 20-5

19 for

Praxis
International
Index

split 8-1

0 proposals

0
proposals

Praxis Value
Index

split 5-1

split 14-3

split 20-1

0 proposals

0 proposals

1 for

3 against

split 5-4

0
proposals

0 proposals

0 proposals

0
proposals

0 proposals

0 proposals

0
proposals

Pax Global
Environmental
Markets Instl
Morgan
Stanley Inst
Global Opp I
Calvert
Emerging
Markets
Equity I
RBC Emerging
Markets
Equity I
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AB Sustainable
Global
2 for
Thematic A
Amana
Income
2 against
Investor
Domini
Impact
0 proposals
International
Equity Inv
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split 1-3

1 for

1 against

3 against

0 proposals

0
proposals

Eventide
Gilead N

0 proposals

2 for

1 for

Neuberger
Berman
Socially Rspns
Inv

1 for

split 3-3

1 for

Parnassus
Mid-Cap

0 proposals

0 proposals

2 for

0 proposals

0 proposals

0
proposals

1 against

split 3-5 117

2 against

Calvert Equity
A

1 for

split 2-1

3 for

TIAA-CREF
Social Choice
Eq Instl

2 for

split 9-5-1

split 14-6

Hartford
Schroders
Emerging
Mkts Eq I
Amana
Growth
Investor

117 This tally includes the apparent vote opposing a gender pay gap proposal at Adobe, discussed
supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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Parnassus
Endeavor
Investor
JPMorgan
Emerging
Markets
Equity A
Parnassus
Core Equity
Investor
Morgan
Stanley Global
Core Portfolio
iShares Core
S&P 500 ETF
Neuberger
Berman Large
Cap Value
Fund
TIAA-CREF
Growth &
Income Fund
Vanguard 500
S&P Index
Vanguard
Equity Income
Fund Investor
Shares
JP Morgan
Emerging
Economies

1965

3 for

split 4-2

0
proposals

0 proposals

0 proposals

0
proposals

3 for

split 4-2

0
proposals

2 against

split 3-3

split 2-1

split 1-12

split 1-29

split 1-37

2 against

5 against

split 4-2

split 2-2

split 3-9

split 5-2

6 against

10 against

21 against

split 1-3

9 against

5 against

0 proposals

0 proposals

0
proposals

There are numerous explanations for why ESG funds in our sample
do not uniformly support shareholder proposals aimed to enhance
portfolio company ESG performance. Importantly, not every fund in our
sample adopts an ESG orientation per se. For example, we included the
Amana funds in our sample based on their AUM, returns, and
Morningstar sustainability ratings, but Amana’s philosophy is more aptly
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described as values-aligned and faith-based. It explains that “[t]he Amana
Funds limit the securities they purchase to those consistent with Islamic
principles.” 118 The voting record of Praxis Growth Index Fund, whose
sponsor “embrace[s] a wide range of social concerns our Christian faith
calls us to consider—as well as traditional, prudent, financial
considerations,” 119 too, is mixed on proposals raising ESG issues. These
faith-based models need not overlap with environmental sustainability
concerns and may offer a different vision of social issues to investors, with
which their voting records may well align.
Even for funds with a secular ESG goal, these issues still entail
challenging and contested questions about what course of action will
achieve ESG gains. For example, many funds in our samples voted on
proposals to adopt or pursue reporting on compliance with the Holy
Land Principles in 2018. Depending on one’s views about the Holy Land
Principles, a yes-vote might be seen to further social considerations
favoring anti-discrimination efforts or to undermine social
considerations by inflaming sectarian conflict. In addition, ESG gains can
be in conflict with each other and will not always correlate with financial
return. Fund management dedicated to integrating ESG factors into their
investment strategies might reasonably dispute the value of individual
proposals that on their face appear geared toward enhancing ESG
performance.
Even if the underlying issue a proposal raises is clearly one intended
to further ESG performance, not all such shareholder proposals will
advocate good ideas and our sample does not attempt to discern the
quality of shareholder proposals. SEC rules impose numerous limitations
on who can make shareholder proposals and their content, 120 and issuers
can seek guidance from the SEC staff on whether submitted proposals can

SATURNA CAP., https://www.saturna.com/amana [https://perma.cc/CEX6-CY4C].
PRAXIS MUTUAL FUNDS, https://www.praxismutualfunds.com [https://perma.cc/9CAMJU7E].
120 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8 (2019) (limiting proposal access to shareholders holding “at least
$2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company’s securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at
the meeting for at least one year” and limiting each such shareholder to one proposal per meeting
and the length of the proposal to under five hundred words).
118
119
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be (relatively) safely excluded from management’s proxy materials. 121
This process will often weed out proposals that raise improper issues or
sow confusion, but a proposal appropriately included on management’s
proxy can still address an ESG issue in a way that a particular ESG fund
considers unnecessary, counterproductive, or unwise.
Consider the Kroger proposal on non-recyclable packaging that was
opposed by Neuberger Berman’s Socially Responsible Fund. The
company faced prior shareholder proposals on this same issue and had
issued a plan in 2016 to address environmental issues in its packaging by
2020. 122 A fund with strong commitments to ESG might view the
company’s efforts as sufficient and the proposed reporting obligation to
be a potential distraction. Indeed, although the shareholder proposal
failed, Kroger announced shortly thereafter that it planned to phase out
plastic bags entirely by 2025. 123
Another good example is the conflicting votes cast by the Morgan
Stanley Global Opportunity Portfolio Fund on two proposals addressing
government use of facial recognition technology at Amazon in 2019. The
Fund voted against a shareholder proposal to prohibit sales of facial
recognition technology to government agencies but abstained on a
proposal requesting a report on the impact of government use of such
technologies. (Management opposed both measures.) Like several others,
this fund also consistently voted yes on proposals on the gender pay gap
but often voted against board diversity proposals. A reasonable ESGcommitted investor may well view government use of facial recognition
as concerning, but not be convinced of the value of an outright ban.

121 See id. § 240.14a–8(i)–(j) (describing the reasons for which companies may exclude
proposals, and the process they must follow to do so, including a requirement that companies
planning to exclude proposals notify the Commission of their plans and reasoning).
122 See THE KROGER CO., NOTICE OF 2017 ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS: 2017 PROXY
STATEMENT AND 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 53 (2017).
123 See Heather Haddon, Kroger to Ditch Plastic Bags by 2025, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23, 2018, 6:30
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/kroger-to-ditch-plastic-bags-by-2025-1535020200 [perma.cc/
PG8W-Y4TM]. Kroger’s packaging policy in place at the time of the vote stated:

By 2020, Kroger will optimize packaging in Our Brands by following a balanced, multipronged approach that considers design attributes including but not limited to food
safety, shelf life, availability, quality, material type and source, function, recyclability and
cost. Through the design optimization process, Kroger will strive to increase the
recyclability of Our Brands manufactured plastic packaging.
The Kroger Co., Schedule 14A Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (May 15, 2018).
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Similarly, such an investor might oppose gender pay disparities but
question the value of board diversity requirements.
Remember, too, the companies in ESG fund portfolios are often
selected for inclusion because of their comparatively high ESG
performance. This selection bias may lead ESG fund managers to prefer
the ESG plans and prerogatives of portfolio company management to
those advocated by shareholder proposals. It also likely explains the
relative paucity of climate change proposals we unearthed in our 2018
samples. As noted in Appendix III, when compiling the 2018 voting
records, we searched only for proposals addressing climate change
specifically. We were disappointed this search yielded relatively few
proposals. To draw in a more representative “E” sample for the 2019 data
reported in Table 4, we also include proposals more broadly addressing
issues of sustainability, but there were still fewer of these proposals than
in our other categories.
Research has also shown that fund families frequently choose to vote
all shares owned by their constituent funds consistently, rather than
voting holdings on a fund-by-fund basis to accord with investor
preferences particular to individual funds. 124 Where deviation from
centralized voting decisions occurs, it is primarily to enable divergent
votes by active funds. Cost pressure and other efficiency concerns and the
desire to maximize a fund family’s influence with portfolio companies
and in the market may motivate this kind of batch voting. But it will often
lead to undermining investor expectations of ESG funds. 125 ESG
proposals can be expensive to implement. A non-specialist fund family
124 See Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 517
(2018) (reporting that “[t]he Big Three closely adhere to their voting guidelines and are thus able
to achieve lock-step consistency in voting across funds” in an article arguing that passive funds
should not vote their shares); Ann M. Lipton, Family Loyalty: Mutual Fund Voting and Fiduciary
Obligation, 19 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 175, 187–89 (2017) (criticizing the practice of fund
families voting all funds “as a block” and canvassing potential reforms); Sean J. Griffith & Dorothy
S. Lund, Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting in Corporate Law, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1151 (2019) (pointing
out this practice in work and setting out a taxonomy of conflicts it creates); Griffith, supra note 34,
at 12–16 (describing this common practice).
125 As the literature in supra note 124 articulated, centralized voting by fund families will
virtually always undermine the preferences of some of their investors. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note
124, at 189–92. Commentators have offered a range of potential reforms to address the issue. See
e.g., Griffith, supra note 34, at 33–48 (arguing both for decentralization of mutual fund voting and
to remove the default practice of mutual fund voting for ESG shareholder proposals). See generally
Lipton, supra note 124, at 187–89 (canvassing potential reforms).
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overall may view the potential financial return on ESG gains as
insufficient to justify these extra expenses in order to achieve ESG gains,
even if managers and investors of its ESG funds would differ.
Centralized voting practices like these could explain the many
surprising Vanguard FTSE Social Index votes. No-votes by this passive
ESG fund are matched by nearly identical votes opposing environmental,
gender/diversity, and political spending proposals by the two Vanguard
funds in our non-ESG sample. Still, centralized voting is clearly not a
universal practice. BlackRock’s iShares’ ESG funds votes supporting ESG
proposals in 2018 diverged notably from the record of the non-ESG
iShares Core S&P ETF. For example, its MSCI KLD 400 Social ETF fund
voted against management and in favor of proposals to report on the
gender pay gap, lobbying payments, board diversity, and global content
management at Alphabet that year, resolutions its Core S&P 500 ETF
opposed. In 2019, however, iShares’ ESG and non-ESG voting patterns
look much more similar.
Funds may also be using engagement strategies other than
shareholder proposal votes to pursue their ESG goals. Particularly for
large players like the passive Big Three, 126 interventions at the board or
executive level may be viewed by fund managers as more important or
effective ways to generate improved ESG performance at portfolio
companies. Although voluntary engagement or stewardship reporting
has become more common, the precise contours of this kind of influence
will remain opaque to investors and other stakeholders.
The most worrisome explanation, of course, is that some ESG fund
sponsors and managers are not as committed to the pursuit of ESG
performance as their branding suggests. Funds meet their fiduciary and
securities law obligations by establishing a share-voting policy consistent
with their clients’ best interests, disclosing the policy to their clients,
and reporting their votes annually to the SEC. 127 Recent SEC Guidance
126 Often referred to as the “Big Three,” BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street now dominate
U.S. passive investing, managing over ninety percent of AUM. See Fichtner et al., supra note 7, at
303–04.
127 Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management
Investment Companies Release Nos. 8188, 25922, 47304, 33-8188, 34-47304, IC-25922 , 2003 WL
215451 (Jan. 31, 2003); Proxy Voting by Investment Advisors Release Nos. 2106, IA-2106, 79 S.E.C.
Docket 1673 (Jan. 31, 2003) (announcing the disclosure regulation and discussing mutual fund
voting more generally); see also Lipton, supra note 124, at 183–87 (discussing the history and
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reminds funds that compliance with their obligations in voting client
shares turns on serving the client’s best interest and warns that funds may
not woodenly rely on the recommendations of proxy advisors. 128 SEC
Guidance recommends a fund “consider how its fiduciary duty and its
[securities law] obligations . . . apply when it has multiple clients” such as
“funds, other pooled investment vehicles, and individual investors, with
differing investment objectives and strategies,” but does not require fund
families to establish and follow fund-by-fund voting policies. 129 Funds
can apply their client-best-interest policy based on their analysis of voting
questions or carefully vet and regularly monitor proxy advisors to whom
they delegate such tasks. Either way, no specific voting content is
required.
A faithless ESG fund sponsor or manager incurs little regulatory risk
by opposing an ESG-enhancing shareholder proposal, so long as doing so
is justified by their client-best-interest policy. Risks from detection by
investors themselves are also minimal. Investors expecting their ESG
fund managers to assiduously pursue ESG performance—whether
because they believe this performance will improve financial returns or
because they care about these factors for non-financial reasons—can
review these votes only if they are extraordinarily diligent. 130 Few are
likely to do so, though, especially across the long list of portfolio
companies contained in a fund and over time. Even for those investors
willing to engage in this effort, their only recourse in the event of a

development of these requirements); Griffith, supra note 34, at 13–16 (relating the history and
noting that while SEC rules—unlike ERISA regulation—do not issue a directive to vote every share,
it has become “the standard practice of mutual funds”).
128 Commission Guidance Regarding Proxy Voting Responsibilities of Investment Advisers,
SEC Guidance Release Nos. IA-5325, IC-33605, 2019 WL 4303125, at *15–16 (Aug. 21, 2019).
129 Id. at *13–14. Anticipated additional SEC regulations of proxy advisors will likely require
them to offer issuers two opportunities for advance review of proxy voting materials they plan to
circulate and to increase the thresholds for defeated proposals to be resubmitted to shareholders at
subsequent meetings. See Patrick Temple-West & Kadhim Shubber, US SEC to Propose Regulations
for Proxy Advisers, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/778602a8-f6b1-11e9a79c-bc9acae3b654 [https://perma.cc/B35U-QT44].
130 See Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. CORP. L. 217, 235–36 (2018)
(describing the voluminous nature of this reporting and summarizing the problem as “there is
currently no way for mutual fund investors to gain a comprehensive view of the voting of the mutual
funds in which they invest or may wish to invest”). Our own efforts confirm the burden and barriers
associated with attempts to do so.
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shareholder proposal vote with which they disagree will be to sell their
holdings in the fund.
Mismatch of ESG investor expectations and ESG fund practices is a
particular concern in the passive context. In an active fund, fund
managers use portfolio composition (both buy and sell) to voice ESG
preferences even if they do not do so by voting on shareholder
proposals. 131 Passive funds have far less ability to exercise voice through
exit, amplifying the importance of vote as ESG voice and signal. Our
sample provides some cause for optimism on this score, as it does not
reveal notable differences in voting activity between active and passive
funds. That said, a finding that passive ESG funds voted more frequently
or consistently for ESG proposals than their active counterparts would
have been more encouraging. Of course, our sample is illustrative rather
than comprehensive, and its fundamental finding is one of variation.
Whether actively or passively managed, the fact that a fund brands itself
as ESG gives investors no assurance of how it will vote its shares.
5.

Unique Passive Risks: Tracking Errors

Tracking error, the final fund attribute our study reviews, is unique
to index investing. Passive funds constructed against an index necessarily
fall short of replicating that index exactly. Tracking error measures this
divergence between a fund’s performance and the performance of the
index that the fund is tracking. 132 Tracking error results from various
causes, including transaction and rebalancing costs, uninvested cash
(drag), differing dividend reinvestment practices, securities lending,
omitted dividend taxes from the index, sampling errors or divergent
techniques, variable swap spreads, variable total expense ratios, fund
operational risks, and choosing the right benchmark index. 133 Average

The authors thank Sean Griffith for this insight.
See e.g., iShares MSCI KLD 400 Social ETF, supra note 61. Tracking error “measures the
quality of index replication, i.e. how well a fund manager replicates the performance of a specific
index.” BEN JOHNSON ET AL., MORNINGSTAR, ON THE RIGHT TRACK: MEASURING TRACKING
EFFICIENCY IN ETFS 5 (2013), https://media.morningstar.com/uk/MEDIA/Research_Paper/
Morningstar_Report_Measuring_Tracking_Efficiency_in_ETFs_February_2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BT84-T5R3] [hereinafter MS Tracking Report].
133 See MS Tracking Report, supra note 132, at 5–8.
131
132
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tracking error 134 for our ESGP sample is 1.67, whereas the average ETF
tracking error is 0.59. 135
All indexed funds face risks associated with indexing itself, including
errors in data, computation, and indexing methodology. iShares funds
disclose the following standard language:
Errors in index data, index computations or the construction of
the Underlying Index in accordance with its methodology may
occur from time to time and may not be identified and corrected
by the Index Provider for a period of time or at all, which may
have an adverse impact on the Fund and its shareholders. 136
While these errors exist with standard index funds, the risks are likely
amplified with indexed ESG funds, especially compared to a standard
S&P 500 index fund. 137 ESG index methodology is opaque as to the
criteria, weights, and balance. There is also greater index asset valuation
variation with ESG indices, driven by a particular index’s ESG preference
compared with standard financial performance measures in traditional
indices.
Table 5 reports tracking errors in our sample of ESGP funds.
Obtaining tracking errors was a challenge and thus the following is
illustrative of the range of tracking errors, rather than a strict comparison
of absolutes. Further, calculating tracking errors, in general, is a process
itself that can be rife with errors given the volume of data, misaligned
data, and calculation errors. 138 Please see the associated footnotes for
additional information on the figures presented. 139

134 See infra note 139. The above reported ranges were averaged for a single tracking error and
that estimated annualized errors are used in the calculations. Average excludes funds for which
there was no reported tracking error.
135 See Lara Crigger, The Top 7 Socially Responsible ETFs, ETF.COM (Mar. 1, 2017),
https://www.etf.com/publications/etfr/top-7-socially-responsible-etfs [https://perma.cc/VZW462E8].
136 iShares MSCI USA ESG Select ETF, supra note 60.
137 See MORNINGSTAR, PASSIVE SUSTAINABLE FUNDS, supra note 35, at 22–23.
138 See MS Tracking Report, supra note 132, at 10.
139 Challenges to obtaining tracking errors included different years reporting the tracking errors
(2017–2018) and different time periods of reported tracking errors ranging from monthly
(annualized to create estimated annual) errors to one-, three- and five-year errors. Unlike other
information reported in this Article, we were not able to obtain (or verify) tracking errors from SEC
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Table 5: 2018 Tracking Errors
Fund
Tracking
Error
Vanguard FTSE Social Index Inv.
1
Calvert US Large Cap Core Rspn Idx I
1.41-1.69 140
iShares MSCI KLD 400 Social ETF
1.65
PowerShares Water Resources ETF
1.2 141
PAX MSCI EAFE ESG Leaders Index Instl
2.49-2.57 142
iShares MSCI USA ESG Select ETF
Guggenheim S&P Global Water ETF
2.02 143
iShares MSCI ACWI Low Carbon Target
ETF
Calvert Global Water A
2.77 144
Guggenheim Solar ETF
2.05 145
Green Century MSCI International Index
Fund - Institution
Praxis Growth Index Fund A
0.67
Praxis International Index A
Praxis Value Index A
1.26
High tracking error does not necessarily mean poor relative financial
performance and vice versa with low tracking errors. 146 Yet, “[t]here is

filings directly, but rather we relied exclusively on third party presentations of the data, often from
state retirement plan documents, internal fund reports, and other sources.
140 Variation reflects a three- and five-year reported tracking error.
141 Estimated annualized tracking error determined from reported monthly tracking error of
0.12.
142 Three-year reported tracking error; variation depends upon class.
143 Estimated annualized tracking error determined from reported monthly tracking error of
0.34.
144 Five-year reported tracking error.
145 Estimated annualized tracking error determined from reported monthly tracking error of
0.35.
146 See MS Tracking Report, supra note 132, at 3. Further, for the ETF funds, tracking error is
an incomplete measure; tracking error alone does not capture “the actual magnitude” of under or
over performance. Id. at 9. Tracking difference is “the annualised difference between a fund’s actual
return and its benchmark return over a specific period of time.” Id. Low tracking difference signals
that the ETF is matchings its stated index. Id.
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usually a trade-off between ESG performance and tracking error.”147
Within our limited review of ESGP Funds, ten funds disclosed specific
investment risks associated with indexed investing and tracking errors.148
The risk disclosures varied in content and complexity from generic
disclosures 149 to a comprehensive mini treatise on tracking errors at 408
words provided by a Guggenheim fund, S&P Global Water ETF, a sectorfocused index fund. 150
Examples of disclosed ESG tracking error include asset, pricing,
transaction, and objective differences between the index and fund. For
example, a fund may hold different assets from the underlying index
because of a representative sampling approach, limited availability of the
security in the amount needed to match the index, uninvested cash for
liquidity, or even tax motivations. 151 Transaction costs and timing are also
commonly disclosed as additional expenses which contribute to tracking
error. 152 Such costs that negatively affect index tracking may include the
costs associated with rebalancing a portfolio to match the index and
account for size or additional brokerage fees, and expense ratios.153
Further, pricing differences between fair value and end of the day net
asset value (NAV) may also drive different returns between the index (fair
value) and the fund (NAV). 154 The use of stewardship and investment

147 MORNINGSTAR, PASSIVE SUSTAINABLE FUNDS, supra note 35, at 21; see also id. at 22–23
(explaining that as funds seek greater impact, tracking error rises compared to the broader market).
148 Notes on file with author.
149 “Asset Class Risk—The securities in the Fund’s portfolio may underperform the returns of
other securities or indices that track other industries, markets, asset classes or sectors.” Guggenheim
S&P Glob. Water Index ETF, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Dec. 29, 2017).
150 Id.
151 See, e.g., iShares MSCI KLD 400 Social ETF, supra note 61 (describing asset differences); see
also Guggenheim Solar ETF, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Dec. 29, 2017) (providing a
comprehensive discussion of tracking errors).
152 “Tracking error also may result because the Fund incurs fees and expenses, while the
Underlying Index does not.” iShares MSCI ACWI Low Carbon Target ETF, supra note 76.
153 “Factors such as Fund expenses, imperfect correlation between the Fund’s investments and
the Index, rounding of share prices, changes to the composition of the Index, regulatory policies,
high portfolio turnover rate and the use of leverage all contribute to tracking error.” Calvert US
Large-Cap Core Responsible Index Fund, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (June 15, 2018).
154

2020]

BUYER BEWARE

1975

screens to alter the indexed portfolio may also contribute to performance
deviations. 155 Finally, some funds may deviate from an index in a hybrid
passive/active strategy and go outside of an index to bolster returns
(financial, ESG, or both) through active investment. 156
Tracking error, a problem with all indexed investments, may be
amplified with ESGP Funds given the opacity of ESG indices, variation in
index attributes, and market size of ESG companies. 157 Investors bear the
actual costs of high tracking errors, plus the added burden of evaluating
tracking error risks without transparency.
6.

Summary

Reviewing the investment strategy disclosures, fees, portfolio
holdings, and voting practices of our sample funds reinforces concerns
that ESG investing, and passive ESG in particular, may have difficulty
delivering on its tremendous promise. The price of ESG investment
products, while decreasing in response to competition, remains high.
Although evidence is mounting that better financial returns are
associated with considering ESG factors in making investments, high fees
can quickly eliminate marginal improvements in financial performance.
ESG investing in practice also includes investment products with a very
broad range of investment strategies, with often little detail on the
contours of a given fund’s ESG practices and commitments. Even vague
definitions can suffice to meet funds’ securities law disclosure obligations

To the extent the Fund calculates its NAV based on fair value prices and the value of the
Index is based on the securities’ closing prices (i.e., the value of the Index is not based on
fair value prices), the Fund’s ability to track the Index may be adversely affected.
Guggenheim S&P Glob. Water Index ETF, supra note 149.
155 “Application of Stewardship Investing screens may contribute to tracking error.” Praxis
Growth Index Fund A, Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (April 30, 2018).
156 See Passive and Enhanced Passive Strategies, PRI, https://www.unpri.org/listed-equity/esgintegration-in-passive-and-enhanced-passive-strategies/15.article [https://perma.cc/ERK5-LHLG]
(describing “enhanced passive” ESG investing as “using the index and its constituent weights as the
core of the portfolio, and engaging in restricted active strategies, including divesting certain
securities, adjusting the weights of constituents and trading derivatives”).
157 For example, smaller capitalization companies introduce higher potential transaction costs
associated with market depth and contribute to price volatility when a fund must buy or sell shares
to maintain index exposure. Anne M. Tucker & Holly van den Toorn, Will Swing Pricing Save
Sedentary Shareholders?, 18 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 130, 140 (2018).
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but leave investors without a clear understanding of how ESG investing
will be practiced by a particular fund and make it difficult to compare
across offerings.
Investigating holdings and voting patterns slightly clarifies this
murky picture, with specialist funds and fund providers emerging as
more often offering distinct—though not necessarily superior—ESG
investment products. Funds targeting particular industries or
sustainability themes offer highly tailored, specialized portfolios that do
not overlap with other funds and do not focus on mainstream
investments in household name companies shared by both more general
ESG and non-ESG funds. In contrast, broad-based ESG and non-ESG
funds appear to invest in largely similar portfolios. Specialist fund
providers often, though certainly not always, appear to use voting on
shareholder proposals to bolster their ESG goals, and generalist players
post an eclectic mix of results. Perhaps ironically, the consistent finding
of our study is one of variation. The funds diverge so widely on our
various metrics that it will be extremely difficult for an investor to know
what she is getting when she invests in an ESG fund.
Passive ESG largely replicates these general concerns, but also
introduces new ones. ESG investors who choose index funds will
generally save on expense ratios when compared to active ESG funds.
Still, fees for ESG index funds are higher than industry averages, raising
the specter of cost overwhelming any additional gains. The problems with
vague disclosures about ESG investment strategies, portfolio holdings
that align with non-ESG funds, and wide-ranging voting patterns appear
in active and passive ESG funds alike. The confounding element of
tracking error, however, is unique to the passive context. Some level of
tracking error is an unavoidable feature of passive strategies; it represents
deviation from the underlying index and need not undermine the
financial performance of a fund. In ESG Index funds, however, investors
will find it difficult to achieve both the low tracking error typical of
broadly diversified funds and strong ESG performance.
The passive ESG trend also compounds the already high level of
opacity in ESG investing. Tracking an index adds another—very
private—layer to a fund’s ESG strategy. Index purveyors argue they are
offering fund providers the deep expertise needed to evaluate ESG factors,
topics on which investment fund experience is shallow. But proprietary
indices designed by private firms like MSCI make it ever more difficult
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for investors to understand and assess the particular version of ESG a
fund pursues.
Beyond concerns about delivering on investors’ expectations from
ESG funds is skepticism that funds can deliver on improved portfolio
firm behavior, especially around environmental and social practices. 158
When ESG can be any combination of the initiatives—environmental,
social, or governance—we suspect that governance attributes are often
pursued over environmental or social attributes because funds and index
providers alike prefer easily tracked ESG practices that are linked to firm
profits and applicable across a range of firms.
The ESG investment landscape, facilitated by an unregulated ESG
market, is heterogeneous and opaque. This, combined with investor
heterogeneity—issues we further explore in the next two Sections—make
the task of matching high ESG-committed investors and investment
products arduous.
II. DEMAND
Despite the significant ESG variation and opacity that the literature
describes159 and our data confirm, a range of investors are flocking to
active and passive ESG. Matching ESG-motivated investors to the right
fund is a multifaceted problem. Investor heterogeneity and intermediated
transactions complicate a potential ESG match. This Part will explore the
diverse set of investors driving ESG asset growth and factors shaping their
choice of ESG investment strategy.
Investor demand for ESG products is far from monolithic.
Individual investors have a range of ESG commitments and fall along a
spectrum of “willingness to pay” for the ESG they desire. 160 As a group,
individual investors also have different preferences and requirements
than institutional investors, even though institutions often serve as
intermediaries and aggregators for individual investors’ portfolios. There
are also many different types of institutional investors, whose interest in
ESG investing differs by client base, regulatory regime, geography, and

158 Brest et al., supra note 17, at 13 (expressing deep skepticism that investment in public
markets can ever change portfolio company behavior).
159 Id. at 1; Barber et al., supra note 17, at 2; Gezcy et al., supra note 17, at 23.
160 Barber et al., supra note 17, at 29.
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other factors. These variations in investor demand for ESG investment
products partly explain the variation in ESG product offerings, as
investors bring their own preferences to bear on market developments
and their appetites and attitudes influence product development. Perhaps
these various segments of the ESG investment market are indeed getting
matched with the ESG they are willing to pay for, but perhaps not.
Individual investor interest in ESG investing is significant and
growing. 161 In part, this growth can be explained by the simple desire to
align one’s investments with one’s values, in the same way individuals
want to feel the warm glow of other products and services they
consume. 162 The shopper who favors Fair Trade coffee to channel her
grocery expenditures to small growers or selects a pink yogurt cup to
support breast cancer research may likewise favor ESG investing over a
standard approach. It is worth noting that our hypothetical “she” is
indeed more likely to be female, and younger than the average investor.
Interest in sustainable and ESG investing appears concentrated in women
and millennials. 163 While fifty-three percent of all respondents in a 2018
survey of high net worth individuals stated that “ESG trade record” was
important in making investment decisions, sixty-four percent of women
and eighty-seven percent of millennials did so. 164 More granular research
161 See MORNINGSTAR, supra note 3, at 1 (collecting studies indicating growing individual
investor interest in sustainable investing).
162 See Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257, 1259–1260 (2011) (describing
the economic concept of warm glow as “the utility one derives from giving” but noting that
companies engaging in corporate social responsibility now frequently sell it).
163 See, e.g., Carol J. Clouse, The New Allure of Sustainable Investing, BARRON’S (June 9, 2018),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-new-allure-of-sustainable-investing-1528502401
[https://perma.cc/3DQS-G4SL] (“While much of the financial industry’s focus on ESG skews
toward the young folks, surveys indicate that women’s interest in this approach is nearly as high as
millennials’.”); John Waggoner, Millennials, Women Drive Assets to ESG Strategies, INV. NEWS
(Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20171107/FREE/171109942/millennialswomen-drive-assets-to-esg-strategies [https://perma.cc/37NA-8A4M] (reporting panelists’
comments at an industry event that “[t]wo groups of people—women and Millennials—are
responsible for the doubling of ESG assets to $8.1 trillion worldwide since 2014”); Beth Brearley,
ESG and Women Investors: A Meeting of Movements, INV. WEEK (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://www.investmentweek.co.uk/investment-week/opinion/3063826/a-meeting-ofmovements-as-industry-joins-forces [https://perma.cc/Y4ZJ-E2AP] (similar).
164 2018 U.S. Trust Insights on Wealth and Worth Survey, BANK AM. (June 2018),
https://newsroom.bankofamerica.com/system/files/2018_US_Trust_Insights_on_Wealth_and_W
orth_Overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VSZ-FCC8]; see also MORGAN STANLEY, SUSTAINABLE
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on the level of ESG impact these more motivated investors are seeking,
and their willingness to pay for it, requires further study.
No matter the demographic, however, individual investor
preferences are often translated through an array of investment
intermediaries (some of which are themselves institutional investors, or
agents of institutional investors). Brokers, investment advisors, family
wealth officers, and pension and retirement plan fiduciaries all channel
individuals’ money into investment products on behalf of their clients
and beneficiaries. These intermediaries’ interest in ESG strategies varies
considerably depending on the type of investor they represent and the
regulatory regime they confront. On the one hand, financial advisors’
appetite for ESG offerings is significant and growing. A 2018 study of
these intermediaries, who counsel individual savers about their
investment choices, found twenty-six percent currently use or
recommend ESG funds to clients and twenty percent “expect to increase
[their] recommendation” of such funds “over the next 12 months.” 165 On
the other hand, pension and retirement plan fiduciaries’ appetite for ESG
investments is mixed. 166
The staggering growth of ESG investing over the last decade is also
fueled by uptake from institutional investors. 167 A 2017 State Street global
study of institutional investors found eighty percent use ESG strategies as
part of their portfolios, representing a wide range of levels of adoption.168
SIGNALS: NEW DATA FROM THE INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR (2017), https://www.morganstanley.com/
pub/content/dam/msdotcom/ideas/sustainable-signals/pdf/Sustainable_Signals_Whitepaper.pdf
[https://perma.cc./P55M-3PLG](reporting seventy-five percent of investors are interested in
sustainable investing, and eighty-six percent of millennials are also interested).
165 FIN.
PLANNING ASS’N, 2018 TRENDS IN INVESTING SURVEY 2, 4 (2018),
https://www.onefpa.org/business-success/Documents/2018%20Trends%20in%
20Investing%20Survey%20Report%20-%20FIN.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7TC-PG54].
166 See infra text accompanying notes 175–191.
167 See MORNINGSTAR, supra note 3, at 1 (citing GLOB. SUSTAINABLE INV. ALL., 2016 GLOBAL
SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT REVIEW (2017)).
168 See STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISORS, ESG INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR SURVEY: PERFORMING FOR
THE FUTURE 6–7 (2017), https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-socialgovernance/2018/04/esg-institutional-investor-survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/JP3G-LVJD]. A
Morgan Stanley survey of “public and corporate pensions, endowments, foundations, sovereign
wealth entities, insurance companies and other large asset owners worldwide” returned similar
results, with “84% of the asset owners” surveyed at least “actively considering” integrating ESG
criteria into their investment process, with nearly half already integrating it across all their
investment decisions. Morgan Stanley Survey Finds Sustainable Investing Momentum High Among
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Results among U.S. institutional investors were strong as well, with “27%
of investors incorporat[ing] ESG factors in at least half of their
investments.” 169 Many of these institutional investors are now committed
to the Principles for Responsible Investment, 170 which now boasts over
2,300 signatories managing over $86 trillion in assets. 171 Signatories to
this project, supported by the United Nations and developed by a group
of institutional investors, 172 pledge to “incorporate ESG issues into
investment analysis and decision-making processes” and to engage in
active ownership around these issues. 173 Every type of institutional
investor can be found amongst the PRI’s signatories: sovereign wealth
funds, public and private pension funds, insurance companies,
foundations and other endowments, and, of course, investment
companies. These distinct types of institutional investors participate in
ESG investing at quite different rates, perhaps indicating a range of
willingness on their part—and the part of the investors they often
represent—to bear ESG investing’s cost.
A.

Pioneers and Major Players

Sovereign wealth funds and U.S. and worldwide public pension
funds were early adopters of ESG investing practices, and today represent
the largest investors in this growing market. 174 The Norwegian
Asset Owners, MORGAN STANLEY (June 18, 2018), https://www.morganstanley.com/pressreleases/morgan-stanley-survey-finds-sustainable-investing-momentum-high [https://perma.cc/
TL4M-KE49].
169 See STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISORS, supra note 168, at 7.
170 See PRI, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT: ANNUAL REPORT 2018, at 25 (2018),
https://d8g8t13e9vf2o.cloudfront.net/Uploads/g/f/c/priannualreport_605237.pdf
[htpps://perma.cc/3JFF-6KGK] (identifying the United States as “PRI’s largest market, with more
than 345 signatories managing US$36 trillion”); MORNINGSTAR, supra note 3, at 27 (reporting that
“[v]irtually all of the largest fund companies in the U.S. are now signatories”).
171 See About the PRI, PRI, https://www.unpri.org/pri/about-the-pri [https://perma.cc/N4QAJQ39] (click on “Data and methodology available here, updated annually”).
172 See About the PRI, supra note 171.
173 See What Are the Principles for Responsible Investment?, PRI, https://www.unpri.org/pri/
what-are-the-principles-for-responsible-investment [https://perma.cc/BH7E-5364].
174 See Tom Arnold, Socially Responsible Investing Catching on Among Sovereign Funds: Study,
REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2019, 8:50 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swf-marketsenvironment/socially-responsible-investing-catching-on-among-sovereign-funds-study-
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Government Pension Fund Global is the world’s largest sovereign wealth
fund and a source of its public pension funding. 175 It has been a pioneer
in this area, first focusing on sustainable investment in 2001. 176 The
Norwegian fund continued to expand its ESG focus over the ensuing
years, in response to government mandates. 177 Today it asserts that
“[g]ood financial return over time is deemed to be contingent on a
sustainable development in economic, environmental and social terms,
and on well-functioning, efficient and legitimate financial markets.”178
Toward this end, it both excludes firms from its portfolio based on
environmental and social goals, and practices engagement on these issues
with the firms in which it invests. 179
Regulation also focuses sovereign wealth/public pension funds in
other European nations on ESG investment by requiring pension funds
to report on how they incorporate ESG in their investment strategies. 180
Beginning in 2016, the EU required member states to allow fiduciaries of
occupational retirement funds to consider ESG factors in investment
decisions and to mandate that these funds include in their investment
idUSKBN1WF1DJ?smbl=esg [https://perma.cc/E46M-DMX9] (describing an Invesco study
finding the already heavily ESG-engaged sovereign wealth segment continues to expand its ESG
investing activity, moving from forty-six percent “includ[ing] a top-down ESG policy” in 2017 to
sixty percent in 2019).
175 See The Government Pension Fund, GOVERNMENT.NO, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/
topics/the-economy/the-government-pension-fund/id1441
[https://perma.cc/JH2B-UKAP];
David Reid, Norway’s $1 Trillion Sovereign Wealth Fund Grows Despite a Volatile Quarter for
Markets, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/21/norways-1-trillion-sovereign-wealth-fundenjoys-returns-on-stocks-and-bonds.html [https://perma.cc/TA3B-X7AM] (identifying Norway’s
sovereign wealth fund as “[t]he world’s largest”).
176 See Beate Sjåfjell et al., Investing in Sustainability or Feeding on Stranded Assets? The
Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 949, 956–57 (2017).
177 See id. at 956–60.
178 See The Government Pension Fund, supra note 175.
179 See Sjåfjell et al., supra note 176, at 959–60.
180 See ERNST & YOUNG, INVESTING IN A SUSTAINABLE TOMORROW: ESG INTEGRATION IN
EUROPEAN PENSIONS 6 (2017), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-investing-in-asustainable-tomorrow/$FILE/ey-investing-in-a-sustainable-tomorrow.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
8E43-2TD6] (summarizing European public pension fund ESG investment and regulation); see also
Attracta Mooney, ESG Wake-Up Call for Pension Laggards, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/a681b422-91a3-11e8-9609-3d3b945e78cf [https://perma.cc/4UMM7PLB] (describing new UK rules that would require pension plan “trustees who disregard the longterm financial risks or opportunities from ESG will have to justify why this does not hurt their
investment returns”).
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policy disclosures how they take ESG issues into account in their
investment practices. 181 Just three years later, the European Parliament
and EU member states agreed to extend these obligations to require
institutional and other asset managers to integrate ESG factors into their
investment decisions and to promulgate a uniform system for ESG
disclosure by financial market participants. 182 Even before the EU
mandate, European assets made up a majority of the global ESG
investment market. 183 The implementation of mandatory ESG
integration across the EU market will only further swell ESG assets under
management globally. Uniform disclosure demanded by this massive
market share, when distilled and disseminated by investment
intermediaries could also improve all investors’ ability to match the ESG
strategies they select to their preferences.
Although European players are in the lead, U.S. public pension
assets are not far behind. 184 One recent report finds public funds
represent fifty-four percent of U.S. ESG assets held by institutional
181 See Directive (EU) 2016/2341 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December
2016 on the Activities and Supervision of Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision
(IORPs), 2016 O.J. (L 354) 37, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%
3A32016L2341 [https://perma.cc/QN9Z-9468].
182 See Press Release, European Comm’n, Capital Markets Union: Commission Welcomes
Agreement on Sustainable Investment Disclosure Rules (Mar. 7, 2019), https://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-19-1571_en.htm [https://perma.cc/5MVE-F32E]. This proposal was part of
a suite of three proposed by the European Commission to improve capital deployment toward
sustainable development. See id. Interest in ESG regulation in Europe continues. Steven Maijoor,
Chair, European Sec. & Mkts. Auth., Sustainable Financial Markets: Translating Changing Risks
and Investor Preferences into Regulatory Action (Feb. 12, 2020) (suggesting EU would also be
moving on issuer disclosure regulation and anti-greenwashing efforts).
183 See GLOB. SUSTAINABLE INV. ALL., 2016 GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT REVIEW 7
(2017),
http://www.gsi-alliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/GSIR_Review2016.F.pdf
[https://perma.cc/64L4-LBTQ] (finding fifty-three percent of the $22.89 trillion in global
sustainable investments were in Europe); see also MORNINGSTAR, PASSIVE SUSTAINABLE FUNDS,
supra note 35, at 6 (noting European dominance in passive sustainable investing as well, citing “an
almost unbroken stream of positive quarterly net inflows”); Sustainable Investing Grows on
Pensions, Millennials, supra note 4 (“Europe leads markets with about half of managed assets
considering sustainability criteria, though growth appears to have leveled off (partly affected by
methodology changes). Canada and U.S. interest continues to increase, while Japan is rising rapidly
on government governance and pension fund efforts.”).
184 See Chris Taylor, Sustainable Investing’s Secret Weapon: Public Pensions, REUTERS (Nov. 12,
2018, 12:52 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-money-investment-esg/sustainableinvestings-secret-weapon-public-pensions-idUSKCN1NH24M [https://perma.cc/7RMV-ZCSW].

2020]

BUYER BEWARE

1983

investors. 185 California’s CalPERS and CalSTRS funds and the New York
State Common Retirement Fund, the three largest U.S. public pension
funds, have made explicit commitments to incorporate ESG into their
investment decisions. 186 Starting in 2020, California law requires its
public pension funds to report on the climate risk 187 in their portfolios,
which may force them to seek out investment products with deeper and
more accountable ESG commitments.
American public pension funds also practice engagement. They vote
their shares directly, even when they invest through intermediary asset
managers that vote on behalf of their other investor clients. 188 They seek
informal influence with company leaders. They even take the more

185 See US SIF, REPORT ON US SUSTAINABLE, RESPONSIBLE AND IMPACT INVESTING TRENDS
2018, at 4–5 (2018), https://www.ussif.org/files/Trends/Trends%202018%20executive%
20summary%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8AQ-PMX6].
186 See,
e.g.,
Environmental,
Social,
&
Governance
Integration,
CALPERS,
https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/investments/sustainable-investments-program/esg-integration
[https://perma.cc/3DMV-X7WK] (last updated July 15, 2019) (“In 2016, each asset class developed
a set of sustainable investment practice guidelines that reflects their needs and strategies.”); ESG
Investment Policy, CALSTRS, https://www.calstrs.com/esg-investment-policy [https://perma.cc/
JP8P-B8RP] (“CalSTRS incorporates PRI and other ESG principles into its investment policies and
practices.”); Corporate Governance, OFF. N.Y. ST. COMPTROLLER, https://www.osc.state.ny.us/
pension/corporategovernance.htm [https://perma.cc/E22K-9RGK] (noting the New York Fund’s
engagement with portfolio companies places emphasis on “environmental, social and governance
(ESG) issues”); Press Release, Thomas P. DiNapoli, Office N.Y State Comptroller, State
Comptroller DiNapoli Adds $3 Billion to the State Pension Fund’s Sustainable Investment Program
(Dec.
7,
2018),
https://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/dec18/120718.htm
[https://perma.cc/8L7C-FE5R] (announcing the New York fund’s additional sustainable
investment commitments, bringing its total to $10 billion); OFFICE N.Y. STATE COMPTROLLER,
NEW YORK STATE COMMON RETIREMENT FUND: ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE
REPORT (2017) [hereinafter NEW YORK STATE COMMON RETIREMENT FUND],
https://www.osc.state.ny.us/reports/esg-report-mar2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RP4T-PKP2]
(reporting on the New York Common Retirement Fund’s ESG strategy to “incorporate[] ESG
analysis more formally into all aspects of its investment process”).
187 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7510.5 (West 2019) (requiring the public employee and teachers’
retirement fund boards to “publicly report on its analysis of the climate-related financial risk of its
public market portfolio, including the alignment of the fund with the Paris climate agreement and
California climate policy goals and the exposure of the fund to long-term risks”).
188 See Griffith, supra note 34, at 9–10 (explaining that while “advisory firms require investors
to delegate their voting rights as a condition to investing in the fund[,] . . . some large institutional
investors—most notably, large pension funds—are able to negotiate exceptions to this rule”).
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unusual step of filing shareholder proposals. 189 New York funds have
been leaders in this area. Of the seventy-nine unique proposals public
pension funds proposed to public companies at 2019 meetings, the New
York City Comptroller submitted fifty-two. 190 The New York State
Common Retirement Fund has also engaged heavily in this tactic, for
example making forty-four proposals in 2018, most often addressing
climate change, diversity, and political spending. 191
Public fund pioneers seeded the sustainable investing and ESG
markets and continue to play major roles in this growing sector. As the
number of jurisdictions mandating ESG integration and disclosure
increases, so will the ability of these major market players to demand the
data and candor they require to match the ESG preferences of their
beneficiaries with available investment products.

189 See generally James R. Copland, Special Report: Public Pension Funds’ Shareholder-Proposal
Activism,
PROXY
MONITOR,
http://proxymonitor.org/forms/2015Finding3.aspx#notes
[https://perma.cc/2XK5-2NHL] (examining public pension funds’ shareholder proposal activity
and finding that “[f]rom 2006 to [2015], state and municipal pension funds have sponsored 300
shareholder proposals at Fortune 250 companies. More than two-thirds of these were introduced
by the pension funds for the public employees of New York City and State”).
190 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2019 PROXY SEASON REVIEW: PART 1: RULE 14A-8
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS 5 (2019), https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/SC-Publication-2019Proxy-Season-Review-Part-1-Rule-14a-8-Shareholder-Proposals.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z42F875W]. In prior years, the Comptroller has sometimes submitted even more proposals. As part of
its multi-season efforts to increase proxy access, the Comptroller submitted seventy-one proposals
on the topic in the 2017 season alone. See N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, 2017 SHAREOWNER INITIATIVES:
POST-SEASON REPORT 7, 11–13 (2017), https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/
documents/2017_Shareowner_Initiatives_Postseason_Report.pdf https;//perma.cc/HR8B-BPJM]
(detailing these efforts, as well as numerous shareholder proposals and other company
engagements around gender pay equity, diversity, climate risk, and other ESG issues); see also
DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST BEST WEAPON
63–74 (2018) (describing the NYC Fund’s proxy access project in a work articulating the power and
potential of pension funds more generally).
191 See
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2018 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 4 (2018),
https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/SC-Publication-2018-Proxy-Season-Review.pdf
[https;//perma.cc/46AW-3TKV]; see also NEW YORK STATE COMMON RETIREMENT FUND, supra
note 186, at 4–6 (chronicling the Fund’s shareholder proposal and other engagement activities over
several years).
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Recent Converts

When and if this ability to make better matches increases, more
recent converts to the ESG investing market will benefit as well. Insurance
companies are one key group of recent converts. They have quickly
become a large segment of the ESG investment market, and their demand
for ESG investment products continues to grow. 192 A 2018 global survey
of insurers found that well over half of “North American (59%) and
European (58%) insurers have already adopted an ESG investment
policy,” and another quarter or more expected to do so in the next year.193
Zurich Insurance Group positions ESG integration of its
investments as part of achieving its core goals. It explains: “To reduce risk
and to help communities. These are among Zurich’s aims in providing
insurance, and in managing its customers’ premiums. Responsible
investment promises to achieve both, which has led us to adopt it in
theory and in practice.” 194 Given insurers’ business exposure to
environmental and social risks, especially those associated with climate
change, they must hedge against these risks as they invest assets they will
need to call upon to pay future claims. 195 The Asset Owners Disclosure
Project recently issued a report demonstrating how these sophisticated
players are carefully matching their impact and cost preferences with
particular ESG investment products—beyond mere investment in the

192 See PETER UHLENBRUCH, SHAREACTION, ASSET OWNERS DISCLOSURE PROJECT, INSURING A
LOW-CARBON FUTURE (2019), https://aodproject.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/AODPInsuring-a-Low-Carbon-Future-Full-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SBT-2T3T] (canvassing how
more than a dozen insurance companies worldwide are integrating climate awareness “into
underwriting, investment, and group-wide risk management practices”).
193 BLACKROCK, GLOBAL INSURANCE REPORT 2018, at 33 (2018), https://www.blackrock.com/
institutions/en-us/literature/whitepaper/global-insurance-report-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
UK8A-7VGK].
194 ZURICH, DOING WELL AND DOING GOOD: WHY ZURICH PRACTICES RESPONSIBLE
INVESTMENT (2017), https://www.zurich.com/-/media/project/zurich/dotcom/sustainability/docs/
zurich-responsible-investment-position-statment-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/NX2S-6LYW].
195 See William T.J. de la Mare, Locality of Harm: Insurance and Climate Change in the 21st
Century, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 189, 197–98 (2013) (“The underwriting and investment sides of
insurance companies are interlinked in the sense that when investment returns are good, the
insurance company may lower its rates to make them more affordable or competitive . . . . [I]n years
when losses are relatively high, the insurer can rely on investment returns to make up for
underwriting losses.”).
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types of ESG mutual and ETF funds reviewed in our study. Due to the
unique risks of climate change to which they are responding, insurers in
the United States and Europe are using asset-level climate scenario
analysis in their investment strategies, seeking fixed income investments
from issuers that contribute to and benefit from long-term sustainability,
weighting their portfolios toward companies contributing to energy and
environmental transition, investing in green bonds, and more. 196
Although tiny in terms of assets under management, some U.S.
foundations and other charitable endowments have also begun to devote
more of their portfolios to ESG investing. Efforts to align endowment
investing with the charitable purposes of an organization is often called
mission-related investing. This classification can also include “impact
investing,” which more often occurs through private and specialized
investments and can contemplate intentionally concessionary financial
returns in service of generating positive social impact. 197
Until quite recently, many foundations worried managing their
endowments to pursue social along with financial returns was at odds
with their fiduciary obligations and tax law expectations about
foundation investment practices. Guidance from the Treasury in 2015
and the revised Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act
clarified that foundation managers have discretion to invest in line with
the charitable purposes of their organizations. 198 The Ford Foundation
credited the Treasury clarification as contributing to its decision to shift

See ASSET OWNERS DISCLOSURE PROJECT, supra note 192, at 30–31.
See Christopher Geczy et al., In Pursuit of Good & Gold: Data Observations of Employee
Ownership & Impact Investment, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 555, 560–63 (2017) (defining impact
investment); Susan L. Abbott et al., Impact Investing for Section 501(c)(3) Organizations, 29 TAX’N
EXEMPTS 17, 20 (2018) (distinguishing mission-related investment from other forms of impact
investment).
198 See Investments Made for Chariable Purpose: Notice 2015-62, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-drop/n-15-62.pdf [https://perma.cc/BME5-T6D3] (“When exercising ordinary business
care and prudence in deciding whether to make an investment, foundation managers may consider
all relevant facts and circumstances, including the relationship between a particular investment and
the foundation’s charitable purposes.”); UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT
§ 3(a), (e)(1)(H) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2006) (allowing
fiduciaries to “consider the charitable purposes of the institution” when making investment
choices); see also Gary, supra note 25, at 786–89 (discussing ESG investment by charitable
fiduciaries).
196
197
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$1 billion of its endowment to mission-related investments; 199 other
foundation endowments large and small may follow suit.
Even skeptics recognize the appeal of market-rate ESG investment
products that can align a foundation endowment’s investment portfolio
with its charitable mission. 200 Investing foundation assets for social
impact in products contemplating below-market risk-return profiles, on
the other hand, remains controversial. 201 The new regulatory flexibility
embodied by the 2015 Treasury Guidance frees foundations to consider
whether they are willing to pay for higher-cost, potentially greater impact
ESG products. To do so, however, they will need to be able to discern
among the vastly divergent ESG products on the market.
C.

Untapped Potential

Private retirement savers too may want to align their portfolios to
their values, but the barriers to ESG investing by private U.S. retirement
plan managers impose significant obstacles. ERISA fiduciary law properly
focuses investment managers’ decision-making on financial returns, 202 as
experience has shown the risk of shortfalls in such plans are all too real.
Each administration since the Clinton DOL has issued guidance
clarifying these obligations for ERISA fiduciaries in the context of
sustainable or socially responsible investments. The tone of these
pronouncements has shifted back and forth—with Democratic
administrations suggesting more openness and Republican ones
199 See Darren Walker, Unleashing the Power of Endowments: The Next Great Challenge for
Philanthropy, FORD FOUND. (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.fordfoundation.org/ideas/equals-changeblog/posts/unleashing-the-power-of-endowments-the-next-great-challenge-for-philanthropy
[https://perma.cc/8P58-Y2MG].
200 See, e.g., Marc Gunther, Hewlett Foundation’s Leader Makes a Case Against Impact Investing,
31 CHRON. PHILANTHROPY 16 (2019) (reporting one foundation leader’s views against impact
investing by foundations, but who still believes ESG investing strategies “are fine as long as they
don’t sacrifice returns”).
201 See Marc Gunther, Doing Good and Doing Well, 31 CHRON. PHILANTHROPY 8 (2019)
(reporting that “despite” considerable public discussion and advocacy for foundations to engage in
impact investing, relatively few foundations engage in impact investing).
202 See ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2018) (directing each ERISA fiduciary to “discharge his duties
with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries . . . (A) for the
exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying
reasonable expenses of administering the plan”).
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expressing more skepticism—up through the Trump administration’s
announcement in April 2018. Throughout, the upshot has remained the
same. In the words of the most recent guidance, “ERISA fiduciaries may
not sacrifice investment returns or assume greater investment risks as a
means of promoting collateral social policy goals.” 203
Social policy considerations are not irrelevant; nor need ERISA
fiduciaries be willfully blind to them. If non-financial issues will impact
financial return, plans should consider them as they would any other
factors in a prudent analysis of risk and return. However, “[f]iduciaries
must not too readily treat ESG factors as economically relevant to the
particular investment choices at issue when making a decision.” 204
Those investments that can achieve social policy goals without
sacrificing financial return are permissible. 205 Fiduciaries of ERISAregulated defined benefit plans, which steward plan assets to ensure
specified payouts for recipients, 206 can make ESG investments so long as
they provide risk-adjusted market-rate returns. ESG investments may
also be made available within ERISA-regulated defined contribution
plans, also known as 401(k) or 403(b) plans, in which beneficiaries make
their own investment choices among a menu of options curated by plan
fiduciaries. 207 Current DOL guidance explicitly states that including “a
prudently selected, well managed, and properly diversified ESG-themed
investment alternative” 208 as one of several amongst which plan
participants can choose can be permissible. It also emphasizes, however,
that such choices are not appropriate default investment options, into
which savers’ funds are placed unless they opt out. 209
The DOL’s various guidance documents in this area have also
addressed shareholder engagement. Again, the tone of their

203 Memorandum from John J. Canary, Dir. Regulations & Interpretations, Dep’t Labor, Field
Assistance Bulletin No. 2018-01 (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/employersand-advisers/guidance/field-assistance-bulletins/2018-01 [https://perma.cc/9XZS-KFQK].
204 See id.
205 See id.
206 See Anne Tucker, Retirement Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the Defined Contribution
Society, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 153, 155–57 (2013).
207 See id. at 157.
208 See Memorandum from John J. Canary, supra note 203.
209 See id.
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pronouncements tends to correlate with the policy preferences of the
issuing administration. In its 2016 guidance, the Obama DOL stated that:
[a]n investment policy that contemplates activities intended to
monitor or influence the management of corporations in which
the plan owns stock is consistent with a fiduciary’s obligations
under ERISA where the responsible fiduciary concludes that
there is a reasonable expectation that such monitoring or
communication with management, by the plan alone or together
with other shareholders, is likely to enhance the value of the
plan’s investment in the corporation, after taking into account
the costs involved. 210
It also specifically contemplated engagement on “policies and
practices to address environmental or social factors that have an impact
on shareholder value” as well as a host of other issues. 211 Guidance from
the Trump DOL in 2018, however, explained that this earlier guidance
“was not meant to imply that plan fiduciaries . . . should routinely incur
significant plan expenses” to engage in advocacy on shareholder issues. 212
Despite the flexibility DOL guidance gives ERISA plan fiduciaries to
consider ESG factors when they impact returns, to include ESG-themed
choices in defined contribution plans, and to practice shareholder
engagement when linked to value, ERISA fiduciaries understandably
remain wary. The shifting tone of the Department’s pronouncements
across administrations is unsettling. Moreover, the tremendous variation
we find across similarly branded ESG investment products will stymie
efforts to identify appropriate ESG investments for ERISA-regulated
plans. Absent robust, standardized ESG disclosures, sophisticated
intermediaries will struggle to identify the right ESG investment to match
beneficiary preferences and fiduciary duties.
The relatively high fees associated with ESG funds can further
hamper retirement plan interest. 213 Consider the plight of the CalSavers

29 C.F.R. § 2509.2016-01 (2019).
Id.
212 Memorandum from John J. Canary, supra note 203.
213 See Mark Miller, Bit by Bit, Socially Conscious Investors Are Influencing 401(k)’s, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept.
27,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/27/business/esg-401k-investingretirement.html [https://perma.cc/H4ZT-297X] (noting target-date funds’ importance to defined210
211
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program. The program is creating a new, publicly managed fund to
provide California private sector workers with portable retirement
savings. In an initial request for proposals, the program sought a suite of
funds for retirement savers including an ESG option, but it was unable to
find a sufficiently low-cost ESG option in this initial process. 214
In this environment, it is not surprising that uptake of ESG
investments by private U.S. retirement plans has been limited. A 2018
study found only “16% of [defined contribution] plans offer a dedicated
ESG option. However, this number masks a large divide among plans:
Only 5% of corporate DC plans offer a standalone option, compared to
the 43% of public and non-profit plans that do so.” 215 The numbers are
increasing, but remain low. A 2019 study released by Callen, the same
private ESG investment advisement firm, reports that thirty-six percent
of defined contribution plans surveyed included an ESG fund in the
lineup—the same percentage reported in BlackRock’s 2019 Institutional
Investor Survey. 216 The regulatory and market barriers to inclusion of
ESG offerings in ERISA-regulated plans, together with the opacity and
variation our study finds among funds themselves, still frustrate
retirement savers seeking ESG alternatives.
Signs suggest private pension plan ESG integration will increase.
While only twelve percent of plan sponsors surveyed in 2018 reported
incorporating ESG into selection of their fund managers, twenty-nine
contribution plan offerings and that “there’s an expense hurdle stopping target date funds from
becoming socially responsible funds”).
214 See Jon Hale, 3 Challenges for Getting ESG Funds into Retirement Plans, MEDIUM (Sept. 2,
2018), https://medium.com/the-esg-advisor/3-challenges-for-getting-esg-funds-into-retirementplans-1ab62c1101ff [https://perma.cc/V8LA-M25E] (describing the CalSavers struggle); see also
Arleen Jacobius, California Secure Choice Goes with Newton for CalSavers ESG Option, PENSION &
INV. (Jan. 29, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.pionline.com/article/20190129/ONLINE/190129852/
california-secure-choice-goes-with-newton-for-calsavers-esg-option
[https://perma.cc/SG6W7UGC] (reporting CalSavers ultimately secured an ESG fund provider).
215 James Veneruso, Most DC Plans Don’t Feel ESG’s ‘Good Vibrations,’ CALLAN (May 29, 2018),
https://www.callan.com/esg-dc [https://perma.cc/D67C-FPVL]. The frequent addition of a
“brokerage window” option for 401(k) plan participants means that they theoretically could choose
virtually any mutual fund or ETF on the market, along with a variety of other investment products.
Utilization of this option, however, is extremely low for a variety of reasons. See Anne M. Tucker,
Locked In: The Competitive Disadvantage of Citizen Shareholders, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 163, 178
(2015).
216 CALLEN INST., 2019 ESG SURVEY 18 (2019) (on file with authors); BLACKROCK, 2019
BLACKROCK DC PULSE SURVEY 31 (2019) (on file with authors).
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percent indicated interest in doing so in the future. 217 Specialist Natixis
Sustainable Future Funds has launched and widely publicized target-date
ESG funds for inclusion in employer-sponsored plans. 218 Reports in 2018
suggested that Wells Fargo and BlackRock also had such vehicles under
development, “betting that a surge in interest in environmental, social or
governance investing will carry through to 401(k)s,” 219 but those offerings
have yet to come online as both firms continue an education-first
approach. 220
The mix of economic and regulatory factors driving the uptake of
ESG investing across different investor groups is unlikely to map perfectly
to the variation across ESG investment products reported in our findings.
Interest among individual investors is already significant and likely to
grow, but how much and what kind of ESG these investors are willing to
pay for remains unknown. Sovereign and public pension funds are major
and enthusiastic ESG investors, with regulation poised to force even
greater adoption as well as more uniform disclosure that may enable them
to better navigate the variation across ESG investment products. Among
other investor groups, uptake is more varied and uncertain. How well
insurance companies and charitable endowments can discriminate
among ESG offerings will determine how effective these recent converts
will be at matching their preferences to available products—a process that
would be aided by a more transparent ESG investment marketplace. The
blend of regulatory uncertainty and high fees mean U.S. private pension
plans are currently underrepresented in ESG investing. More clarity
about the range of ESG commitments various products represent will
217 See BRAD SMITH & KELLY REGAN, NEPC ESG SURVEY: A PROFILE OF CORPORATE &
HEALTHCARE PLAN DECISIONMAKERS’ PERSPECTIVES (2018), https://cdn2.hubspot.net/
hubfs/2529352/files/2018%2007%20NEPC%20ESG%20Survey%20Results%20.pdf?t=
1541714687871 [https://perma.cc/TG2P-7NB9].
218 See Natixis Sustainable Future Funds, NATIXIS INV. MANAGERS, https://www.im.natixis.com/
us/natixis-sustainable-future-funds [https://perma.cc/2T3F-UNNX] (offering ten target-date
alternative active ESG funds).
219 Melissa Karsh & Emily Chasan, BlackRock, Wells Fargo Are Betting on Ethical Investing
Funds for 401(k)s, BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-06-13/blackrock-wells-fargo-are-said-to-push-esg-funds-for-401-k-s
[https://perma.cc/6XUF-YEQ4].
220 See e.g., John Manganaro, Sponsors Can Expect Expanding ESG Opportunities,
PLANSPONSOR (Apr. 16, 2019) (quoting Ron Cohen, Wells Fargo Asset Management’s head of
defined contribution investment only (DCIO) sales); see also, BLACKROCK, supra note 216, at 29–
31.
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likewise be required to unleash this still untapped potential. The final
category of institutional investors—fund complexes themselves—are also
key players in developing the ESG market. The next Part considers their
complementary role as suppliers of ESG investment products.
III. UNMASKING ESG SUPPLY SIDE DRIVERS
Diverse supply side forces also drive ESG asset growth and
contribute to ESG market heterogeneity and opacity. For example, fund
creators compete with each other on fund performance and fees, and each
seeks to differentiate its offerings from those of its competitors in a
crowded investment management market. Funds must also retain
established clients and draw in new ones and design products that will
generate revenue to support the fund complex’s bottom line. 221 ESG
investing presents opportunities for fund creators to serve their own
interests in each of these ways and masking ESG product variation can
often enhance these opportunities for generalist funds. Rising interest in
ESG investing has also generated a huge market opportunity for the
providers of ESG indices and metrics, who are likewise capitalizing on
this key moment. This Part considers how fund creators’ and index
providers’ responses to these pressures and opportunities are
contributing to the development of ESG investing.
Supply side market forces are largely unbridled because investment
law has little to say about the substance of ESG investing. 222 A
combination of investor “control” over investment allocations and
intermediated fiduciary duties through employer plan sponsorships
leaves investment products and retirement investors in a largely
221 Vanguard would argue its unique structure differentiates it from its competitors on this
score. See Why Ownership Matters, VANGUARD, https://about.vanguard.com/what-sets-vanguardapart/why-ownership-matters/#targetText=Our%20unique%20client%2Downed%20structure,%
22mutual%22%20mutual%20fund%20company [https://perma.cc/8JU4-3TYU]. It remains,
however, a company focused on remaining a significant and profitable market player.
222 At the portfolio company level, too, law plays a minor role. Corporate statues are generally
silent as to corporate objectives and whether and to what extent corporate fiduciaries should
consider sustainability and other social concerns is rarely litigated. See Dana Brakman Reiser,
Progress Is Possible: Sustainability in US Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY
131, 134–37 (Beate Sjåfjell & Christopher M. Bruner eds., 2019).
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unregulated space, save for the standard financial disclosures required
and claims facilitated by SEC regulations. 223 Fund compliance officers
likely disagree when peering from under the web of regulation, but from
a consumer standpoint investment products are a low-regulatory
environment where market forces dominate. Index providers operate
completely outside of regulation, offering private products answerable to
no one. 224 When developing ESG investment products, fund complexes
and index providers in this low-regulation environment respond to the
financial incentives that motivate them: increasing market share (and
AUM for fund complexes) and earning fees.
As the evidence shifts to accept that ESG factors influence financial
returns, fund families’ business models are implicated directly. If funds
perform better financially when investments excel on ESG factors, fund
complexes can boost AUM and expand market share by outperforming
competitors on ESG integration. To seize this opportunity, funds will
develop active funds that consider ESG as they select investments and
implement the methods of ESG investing that best align with financial
return. In their passive fund portfolios, fund creators will pursue ESG
indices and other metrics that likewise align with financial performance.
While ESG engagement strategies might help active and passive funds
alike to mitigate risk, passive funds’ relative lock-in to the firms within a
given index increase the importance of engagement for this market
segment.
BlackRock, the largest U.S. investment company, signals the
growing link (or at least messaging) between ESG factors and financial
return. BlackRock, typifying a shifting market ethos, has reimagined itself
as a force for good. 225 In recent years, the mutual fund giant has
committed to increased ESG investing. Perhaps most prominently,
BlackRock Chairman and CEO Larry Fink expressed concern in his 2018
letter to CEOs of its investee companies that
223 As one author has written about separately, federal regulation of retirement plans is
piecemeal and trifurcated between the DOL, Internal Revenue Service, and SEC leaving everyone,
and no one, driving retirement plans the way beneficiaries may assume. See Tucker, supra note 206,
at 215–18 (discussing the oversight and structural limitations of ERISA regulations).
224 See
Market Indices, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersindiceshtm.html
[https://perma.cc/FEG3-BRV3] (explaining that “[t]he SEC does not regulate the content of these
indices” used to compose indexed mutual funds and ETFs).
225 BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate#intro [https://perma.cc/83VH-S4XH].
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[t]o prosper over time, every company must not only deliver
financial performance, but also show how it makes a positive
contribution to society. Companies must benefit all of their
stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, customers,
and the communities in which they operate. 226
Fink pledged BlackRock would use its considerable clout with portfolio
companies to demand long-term growth strategies that take sustainability
issues into account, at least as they contribute to growth and profitability.
Despite mixed responses to the 2018 letter, the following two years’
missives doubled down on the ESG theme. Fink asserted that “profits and
purpose are inextricably linked,” 227 “sustainable investing is the strongest
foundation for client portfolios,” and “purpose is the engine of long-term
profitability.” 228
Corporate leaders, too, are signaling their support. The Business
Roundtable, the preeminent U.S. association of large corporations, 229
released a statement in the summer of 2019 backing away from the
shareholder primacy perspective it had long espoused. Instead, it
announced that companies “share a fundamental commitment to all of
our stakeholders,” including customers, employees, and suppliers, as well
as shareholders, and a commitment “to deliver value to all of them, for
the future success of our companies, our communities and our
country.” 230 Earnings calls by individual companies increasingly address
ESG issues as well. 231 Even the Financial Times joined the chorus, with an
226 Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, Blackrock, to CEOs (Jan. 12, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/16/business/dealbook/document-BlackRock-sLaurence-Fink-Urges-C-E-O-s-to-Focus.html?dlbk [https://perma.cc/VF34-FL5V].
227 Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, BlackRock, to CEOs (Jan. 16, 2019)
[hereinafter 2019 Letter from Larry Fink], https://www.blackrock.com/americas-offshore/2019larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/Z7MG-DKYB].
228 Letter from Larry Fink, supra note 10.
229 See
About Us, BUS. ROUNDTABLE, https://www.businessroundtable.org/about-us
[https://perma.cc/8FD2-6V5S].
230 Our Commitment, supra note 11.
231 See Karen Langley, More Companies Are Making Noise About ESG, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23,
2019, 2:33 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/more-companies-are-making-noise-about-esg11569263634 [perma.cc/T969-LVGT] (reporting “[t]wenty-four companies in the S&P 500
mentioned the acronym ‘ESG’ on earnings conference calls between June 15 and Sept. 14, double
the number . . . in the first quarter” and an enormous jump from two years earlier when only two
had done so).
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opinion from its editorial board arguing “retail savers and the investment
industry should embrace a corporate perspective that looks beyond the
narrow bottom line to take into account companies’ impact on climate
and environment, workers and the communities they operate in” as a way
to enhance corporate value over the long term. 232
These developments are also propelled by the swelling importance
of millennials as employees, consumers, and investors. For example,
Fink’s 2019 letter explained, “[a]s wealth shifts and investing preferences
change, environmental, social, and governance issues will be increasingly
material to corporate valuations.” 233 Not all fund complexes will climb
out as far on the ESG limb as BlackRock claims to be going, but
generational shifts will impact them all. If Fink’s predictions are borne
out, other fund complexes—whether in or outside of the public eye—will
need to ramp up their reputation for responding to ESG issues to keep
their funds’ returns competitive and appeal to the investors of the future.
Scholars Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis, and David H. Webber have
forcefully argued this shift is already occurring. 234 Fielding ESG
investments, no matter where they fall on the spectra of cost and impact,
will help build reputational capital 235 with this increasingly important
demographic.
ESG funds offer fund complexes benefits beyond the assets invested
in ESG funds themselves. Consider retirement plan administrators
creating the highly curated investment menu (in the ballpark of twenty

232 Editorial Board, Investors Should Look Beyond the Bottom Line, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/30b3b8d2-f014-11e9-ad1e-4367d8281195 [https://perma.cc/B4QKDVNP].
233 2019 Letter from Larry Fink, supra note 227; see also Langley, supra note 231 (identifying
“[o]ne contributing factor [as] a transfer of wealth to members of the millennial generation, who as
a group are more focused on sustainability”).
234 See Michal Barzuza et al., Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund Activism and the New Millennial
Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 47–53),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3439516 [https://perma.cc/GMG9-VZZQ] (arguing index funds
significant engagement and voting activity on matters of social activism can be explained by their
desire to compete for the current and future investment business of the millennial generation).
235 Cf. Claire A. Hill, Marshalling Reputation to Minimize Problematic Business Conduct, 99 B.U.
L. REV. 1193, 1213 (2019) (arguing that business reputation—both in avoiding “reputational risk
events” and in creating a generally positive image among consumers, regulators, and others—aligns
with profitability).
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funds) 236 for participants to allocate their retirement savings. Including
ESG funds in a fund family facilitates direct investment opportunities in
those funds, but it may also garner goodwill about the fund family,
facilitating investment in traditional products carried by a fund with both
ESG and traditional offerings.
Thereby, advertising for ESG-related vehicles can be used to
influence fund flows to a fund family’s ESG and non-ESG products alike.
For example, in 2018, coinciding with the largest fund flow to passive
funds ever at the time, TIAA-CREF launched a new advertising campaign
for Nuveen, the firm’s ESG investing arm. The campaign was titled
“investing by example” and included video content for Internet and
television, and nationwide billboard and print advertising. 237 The
campaign focused on the positive ripple effect of investments with the
line, “When we invest in a world we’re proud to leave behind, it isn’t just
business as usual. It’s investing by example.”238 The campaign contained
intentional features to reach baby boomers as well as young investors; for
example, it used a band popular with millennials to play a cover of the
1970s band the Carpenters. The ads also harkened back to TIAA-CREF’s
founder, Andrew Carnegie, and linked the legacy investment arm with
the new ESG practice. 239
Critically, ESG investing also provides fund complexes with a
welcome counterbalance to the passive investing trend and its negative
effect on fees. Fund complexes rely for revenues in large part on the
higher fees paid for active fund investments. 240 As data emerged showing
passive funds consistently outperforming their active counterparts,
particularly when returns are considered net of fees, fund flows to passive
strategies increased, and active managers have come under pressure to
236 See, e.g., Janice Kay McClendon, The Death Knell of Traditional Defined Benefit Plans:
Avoiding a Race to the 401(k) Bottom, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 809, 831 (2007) (citing an average of
eighteen choices in a defined contribution plan menu).
237 MullenLowe,
Nuveen—Investing
by
Example,
DRUM
(Sept.
2018),
https://www.thedrum.com/creative-works/project/mullenlowe-nuveen-investing-example
[https://perma.cc/RH94-QA2A].
238 @NuveenInv, TWITTER (Sept. 20, 2018, 11:01 AM), https://twitter.com/NuveenInv/status/
1042790840287027201 [https://perma.cc/HF5D-XWVT].
239 MullenLowe, supra note 237.
240 See Fisch et al., supra note 47, at 36–37 (reporting that even passive fund specialists like
Vanguard field numerous active funds).
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reduce fees or justify them in some way. 241 The costs and challenges of
ESG investment can be used to support active management strategies and
to justify higher fees in actively and passively managed funds alike.
After all, even funds marketed as ESG index products often include
some active elements like screening—and associated higher fees.242
Relatively higher-fee ESG offerings can thus offset lower fees earned on
ordinary indexed assets and fund flow favoring passive strategies. 243 In
this way, ESG investment products can also strategically respond to the
existential threat fund complexes face from the rise of passive investing.
The growing pool of investors demanding alignment of their
investments with their values may accept that strong ESG investment
performance justifies higher fees. As suggested by the variation of ESG
commitment our study reports, it will be difficult and costly for high-ESG
investors to determine which ESG investment products provide the best
match for their preferences. Without more transparent and consistent
information about how funds live up to their ESG label, individual and
institutional investors will be unable to investigate the matter thoroughly
and act accordingly.
When obscured, ESG variation also invites a broader market harm
that combines greenwashing and free-riding. 244 High ESG funds may be
fueling sector development in green energy or clean water, generating
anecdotal evidence of high ESG impact. The anecdotes and goodwill of
such highly committed ESG funds can spill over to less committed ESG
funds when investors cannot differentiate between their claims of ESG
effort or impact. For example, consider the Vanguard FTSE Social Index,
a fund in our ESGP sample that voted against every ESG proposal we
241 See Charles Stein et al., Free Fidelity Funds Stoke Price War in Bid to Catch Index Giants,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 1, 2018, 11:08 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-01/
fidelity-to-offer-index-mutual-funds-with-zero-expense-ratio (describing how all of the major
mutual fund and ETF providers are engaged in fee reduction to capture investors seeking low-price
options).
242 See, e.g., Praxis Growth Index Fund A, supra note 155.
243 See MORNINGSTAR, supra note 3, at 27–28 (positing that fund creators repurposing actively
managed funds experiencing outflows “would not be surprising”). Future work could examine the
relationship between fund flows out of actively managed funds and the rise of ESG funds.
244 Greenwashing is when companies, or here, investment firms, mislead consumers (investors)
about the social or environmental benefits of their products or services. For a discussion of
greenwashing, see Magali A. Delmas & Vanessa Cuerel Burbano, The Drivers of Greenwashing, 54
CAL. MGMT. REV. 64 (2011).
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tracked between 2018–2019 and which held exclusively household name
brand companies in its top ten holdings for both years (including Wells
Fargo, JP Morgan, Citigroup, Mastercard, and Visa). Vanguard ESG
marketing boasts its ESG investment options are funds “[w]here your
money can reflect what matters to you.” 245 Absent market discipline
provided by clear signals to high ESG-committed investors to invest in
high-ESG funds, low-ESG funds have little incentive to increase their own
ESG. Further, high-ESG funds subsidize the ESG brand while potentially
losing committed ESG capital.
The variation we find across ESG investment products is also driven
in part by the firms providing ESG metrics, benchmarking ESG
performance, and, most importantly, designing ESG indices. As noted
above, intermediaries that produce and sell these opaque systems, like
MSCI and FTSE Russell, play an outsized role in ESG indexed equity
funds. 246 By at least one measure, metric and index providers also appear
to be pursuing widely disparate visions or applications of ESG. A 2018
study by Schroders found a remarkable “lack of consistency in ESG scores
between the main data providers.” 247 An Economist study of two major
ESG rating firms found “ESG scores are poorly correlated with each
other.” 248 This variation makes sense in a growing industry, in which each
player is seeking to gain market share and justify its fees to potential fund
complex customers.
Beyond their contribution to the variation our study finds, it is
important to note the tremendous influence index and other ESG metric
providers wield over how institutional investors will prioritize and
operationalize ESG factors. They quite literally are setting the standards
for what counts as ESG. By dint of their power in the investment

245 ESG Investing: Where Your Money Can Reflect What Matters to You, VANGUARD,
https://investor.vanguard.com/investing/esg [https://perma.cc/73Z4-SP3F].
246 See supra text accompanying notes 89–92. New players are also hurtling into the ESG metric
field. See Billy Nauman, Credit Rating Agencies Join Battle for ESG Supremacy, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 16,
2019), https://www.ft.com/content/59f60306-d671-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77 [https://perma.cc/
GAH8-59YL] (describing “Moody’s and S&P Global, two of the big three credit rating agencies” as
“elbowing their way in, offering separate ESG scores on companies in addition to their traditional
assessments of creditworthiness”).
247 See Ovidiu Patrascu, Index-Based ESG Strategies: Key Things to Watch for, SCHRODERS (Aug.
10, 2018), https://www.schroders.com/en/us/institutional/thought-leadership/sustainability/
index-based-esg-strategies-key-things-to-watch-for [https://perma.cc/67QZ-8HPT].
248 ESG Investing: Poor Scores, ECONOMIST, Dec. 7, 2019, at 67.
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marketplace, these very private players also will impact the ESG goals to
which portfolio companies will aspire. To appease their clients and
maintain their market dominance, index and metric providers will
naturally seek to identify new, different, value-added ways to measure or
index for ESG factors that contribute to financial performance, but these
may or may not align with either investor preferences or societal needs in
these areas. The private nature of the indices means neither investors nor
the rest of us will likely ever know.
IV. ANALYSIS AND RESPONSES
Over the last decade, enormous amounts of money have flown into
ESG and now ESG index funds, driven by a combination of demand-side
and supply-side forces. Whether motivated by their individual values,
legal requirements, or a vision of ESG factors driving financial return,
investors are seeking products that respond to systemic risk, climate
change, and social inequality whether in name or practice. Fund creators’
relentless pursuit of tools to better predict financial return, as well as their
desire to increase market share and enhance revenues in an industry
rocked by the rise of passive investing, are leading them to supply a
dizzying array of ESG products. Passive EGS products in turn are
increasingly linked to opaque and unaccountable specialty indices. In
ESG investing’s low-regulation environment, these market forces are
largely unchecked.
The variety and opacity of ESG funds leaves even a diligent and wellintentioned investor without assurance that an ESG investment, and even
more so one in an ESG index fund, will match her preferences. It is
beyond the scope of this Article to comprehensively consider the marketbased and regulatory strategies for improving ESG products’ ability to
satisfy investor expectations and harness the investment market to
improve environmental and social sustainability. In this Part, however,
we briefly sketch some promising alternatives and identify areas for
exploration in future research.
The market, already the most powerful force in this low-regulation
space, is one promising place to seek improvement in ESG investing. If
investors, both individual and institutional, demand more clarity about
ESG practices and commitments, fund creators can be expected to
respond. On the individual side, we can expect the growing financial
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weight of women and millennials to continue to increase demand for
more and better ESG investing performance over branding. Like all
individual investors, though, they face coordination problems and
information deficits. Therefore, intermediary behavior will be key. Expert
investment intermediaries can demand greater clarity and assessment
from fund creators, especially if the potential of ERISA markets can be
tapped. On the institutional side, a combination of business goals and
legal dictates will also increase demands for reliable and transparent ESG
investment products. Sustained evidence linking ESG investing to
financial performance will intensify institutional investors’ demands for
real and accountable ESG integration. Disclosure requirements in the EU
are already driving ESG innovation and transparency. If this major
market mandates its largest players to integrate ESG, it will in turn push
fund creators worldwide to offer complying and transparent products.
The impact of regulation already being felt in Europe is just one
example of how legal intervention can play a positive role in improving
ESG investing’s ability to deliver across the range of ESG investor
preferences. It seems far-fetched to imagine U.S. regulators imposing
ESG integration mandates. 249 Disclosure requirements on companies and
funds, however, could be updated to include information on ESG
factors. 250 Much of the discussion around ESG or sustainability disclosure
in the United States has revolved around issuer (as opposed to fund)
obligations. 251 Currently, securities regulation imposes no broad-based
249 Bills to this effect have been introduced in Congress but have not progressed very far. See,
e.g., ESG Disclosure Simplification Act of 2019, H.R. 4329, 116th Cong. (2020) (mandatory ESG
reporting legislation introduced in the House).
250 Consumer facing financial disclosure is a favored regulatory intervention, but one with
haunting criticisms around investors’ use. Homer Kripe vehemently made this case with the
“hypothesis . . . that the prospectus is intended for the man in the street, the unsophisticated lay
investor . . . is a myth . . . [and] largely responsible for the fact that the securities prospectus is fairly
close to worthless.” Homer Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 BUS. LAW. 631, 632
(1973); see also Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461, 466–68 (2015) (defining
reasonable investors); Charles R. Korsmo, The Audience for Corporate Disclosure, 102 IOWA L. REV.
1581, 1586–87 (2017) (introducing a taxonomy of securities disclosure audiences). Our disclosure
suggestion rests upon assumptions of a sophisticated intermediary such as analysts or retirement
professionals to distill and disseminate disclosure contents to investing consumers.
251 See, e.g., Ann M. Lipton, Mixed Company: The Audience for Sustainability Disclosures, 107
GEO. L.J. ONLINE 81 (2018) (arguing issuer disclosures should more broadly address sustainability);
Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 923, 952–56 (2019)
(advocating a new mandatory sustainability discussion and analysis section of issuers’ annual
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requirement for companies to engage in such disclosures, 252 although
companies frequently issue voluntary disclosures styled as corporate
responsibility or sustainability reports. 253 Organizations like the Global
Reporting Initiative 254 and Sustainability Accounting Standards Board 255
offer tools to standardize this voluntary reporting, but at the moment
voluntary company reports remain diverse and often difficult to
compare. 256 The conversation about issuer disclosure is important, but
resolving it will not necessarily provide fund investors with sufficient
information. When they invest in funds combining scores of individual
issuers, disclosures around the ESG practices of a fund or its associated
index would be far more informative. 257 The European experience can
help U.S. regulators distill the focus and content of any disclosure

disclosures); Roberta S. Karmel, Disclosure Reform—The SEC Is Riding off in Two Directions at
Once, 71 BUS. LAW. 781 (2016); see also Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation
S-K Release No. 33-10064, at 206-15 (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2016/3310064.pdf [https://perma.cc/YUQ8-UAGS] (requesting comments on whether the SEC should
mandate sustainability disclosure by issuers).
252 For the SEC’s most recent efforts at more targeted ESG disclosure, see Modernization of
Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105 Release Nos. 33-10668, 34-86614, at 48 (August 8, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2019/33-10668.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2SA4-N7VD]
(proposing to replace a reporting obligation to merely state its number of employees with “a
description of the registrant’s human capital resources, including . . . human capital measures or
objectives that management focuses on in managing the business”); see also Fisch, supra note 251,
at 947–52 (describing the lack of SEC mandates in this area, with discussion of limited disclosure
obligations it has imposed around climate change and board diversity).
253 See KPMG, THE ROAD AHEAD: THE KPMG SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
REPORTING 2017, at 4 (2017), https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2017/10/kpmgsurvey-of-corporate-responsibility-reporting-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/736M-KJQJ] (finding
“CR reporting is standard practice for large and mid-cap companies around the world” with threequarters of companies surveyed engaging in the practice).
254 See About
GRI, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, https://www.globalreporting.org/
information/about-gri/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/WH28-CR7J].
255 See Standards Overview, SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, https://www.sasb.org/
standards-overview [https://perma.cc/4VH2-KQVU].
256 See Fisch, supra note 251, at 944–46; Jill M. D’Aquila, The Current State of Sustainability
Reporting: A Work in Progress, CPA J. (July 2018), https://www.cpajournal.com/2018/07/30/thecurrent-state-of-sustainability-reporting [https://perma.cc/9ZV7-P5EX].
257 Cf. STEPHEN DAVIS ET AL., WHAT THEY DO WITH YOUR MONEY: HOW THE FINANCIAL
SYSTEM FAILS US AND HOW TO FIX IT 139–41 (2016) (addressing the need to regulate investment
intermediaries); see also Doug Chia, Big ESG, SOUNDBOARD GOVERNANCE (Nov. 11, 2019),
https://www.soundboardgovernance.com/post/big-esg [https://perma.cc/ZKT5-88EU] (arguing
that company ESG disclosure rewards volume over quality).
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mandates it might impose on investment companies, and future work in
this area is warranted.
Another legal intervention to increase the transparency and
effectiveness of ESG investing would take advantage of a different set of
investment market actors: private employers and their retirement plan
administrators. As discussed above, operating in the shadow of often dire
DOL warnings about non-financial investment considerations, these
ERISA fiduciaries currently make relatively little use of ESG investment
products. This barrier should be removed or reframed to seize upon
growing links between ESG performance and financial performance,
particularly over the long-term, and its consequent compatibility with
retirement savings goals. In doing so, however, the DOL should prod
ERISA fiduciaries to become demanding consumers of ESG products,
requiring transparent and consistent disclosures of ESG strategies, and
their impact on fees, diversification, and tracking error. Fund creators not
wanting to miss out on the enormous ERISA-regulated asset market
would have significant incentives to respond.
Regulating index providers is yet another route to improving the
content, consistency, and transparency of ESG investment products. By
creating the metrics that fuel ESG investing, these thoroughly private
players wield great public power over markets—and more. One need only
look to the role of the rating agencies in the 2008 financial crisis to be
reminded of the tremendous impact seemingly unassuming metric
providers can produce.
European regulation has again been at the forefront here, with its
European Benchmark Regulation in force since January 2018. This
Regulation creates “a common framework to ensure the accuracy and
integrity of indices used as benchmarks in financial instruments and
financial contracts, or to measure the performance of investment funds
in the Union.” 258 It was prompted by scandals like LIBOR 259 and concerns
258 See Regulation (EU) 2016/1011, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2016 on Indices Used as Benchmarks in Financial Instruments and Financial Contracts or to
Measure the Performance of Investment Funds, 2016 O.J. (L 171) 1, art. I, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.171.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=
OJ:L:2016:171:TOC [https://perma.cc/3PQN-LCK4].
259 See id. (noting in the preamble at (1) that “[s]erious cases of manipulation of interest rate
benchmarks such as LIBOR and EURIBOR, as well as allegations that energy, oil and foreign
exchange benchmarks have been manipulated, demonstrate that benchmarks can be subject to
conflicts of interest”).
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about the growing influence and concentration of index providers in the
passive investing space more generally, and not with ESG indices in mind.
Its authority sweeps broadly, however. Whether it will be effective in
constraining index providers, and in what ways, will depend on how it is
implemented. But index providers seeking to operate in the EU market
(read: virtually all of them and certainly all of the big ones) are watching.
The topic of index regulation looms large on the U.S. regulatory
horizon as well. The massive shift of investment assets under
management to passive strategies empowers private index providers.
They are generating huge profits and the market is consolidating. 260 The
longstanding view that index providers are mere publishers, not subject
to regulation as investment advisors, 261 is ripe for revision. The ESG
context, where index providers devise bespoke indices, sometimes for use
by a single fund, is an example of the declining utility of the publisher
analogy. Review of the idea that a fund’s disclosure that it uses a particular
index is sufficient without greater elaboration is likewise overdue. The
SEC’s recent proposed regulations on ETFs failed to address index
regulation, but this effort certainly drew its attention to the explosive
growth and power of index providers.262 If and when the SEC sets its

260 See Naumann, supra note 246 (describing the large and growing market for ESG ratings);
Dieter Holger, ESG Investing Trend Has Powered Index Giant MSCI to Market Outperformance in
2019, MARKETWATCH (Sep. 12, 2019, 3:43 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/esginvesting-trend-has-powered-index-giant-msci-to-market-outperformance-in-2019-2019-09-12
[perma.cc/7G7M-YRNC].
261 The Investment Advisors Act exempts publishers “of any bona fide newspaper, news
magazine or business or financial publication of general and regular circulation” from its regulatory
purview, 15 USC § 80b-2(a)(11)(D) (2018), and the U.S. Supreme Court opined that the exemption
warranted a “broad reading,” Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 183, 204–05 (1985). Index providers rely
on their position providing general, rather than client-centered, evaluation and advice to avoid
regulation. See Rachel Evans, A $3.6 Trillion Regulatory Hole Around ETFs Gets SEC Scrutiny,
BLOOMBERG (July 18, 2018, 10:51 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-18/a3-trillion-regulatory-hole-surrounding-etfs-gets-sec-scrutiny [https://perma.cc/DNH6-CH9H].
262 See Exchange Traded Funds Release Nos. 33-10515, IC-33140, at 11 (June 28, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2018/33-10515.pdf
[https://perma.cc/589S-YXVS]
(discussing ETFs’ reliance not only on “broad-based” but also “specialized,” “customized or
bespoke indexes”); see also Dalia Blass, Dir., SEC Division Inv. Mgmt., Keynote Address, ICI 2018
Mutual Funds and Investment Management Conference (March 19, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-blass-2018-03-19
[https://perma.cc/T8SK-A3KY]
(suggesting, in a speech “only for myself and not for the Commission, the Commissioners or the
staff,” that innovation in the index market may mean it is time to “revisit” these regulatory issues).
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sights on index regulation, the particular challenge of making ESG indices
transparent and accountable must be part of the conversation.
CONCLUSION
The promise of ESG investing in general, and passive ESG in
particular, is enormous: guilt-free and lower-cost retirement savings for
the conscientious consumer investor. Despite its astounding recent
growth in AUM and the widely publicized embrace of stakeholderism
from so many quarters across the business community, investors will
have difficulty identifying products to match their ESG preferences. The
offerings in this essentially unregulated market are endlessly varied and
its use of ESG factors is opaque. ESG investment strategies are difficult to
parse and nearly impossible to compare. Portfolio holdings and fund
voting records vary widely in how much they differ from non-ESG
alternatives. Investigating any of these differences across the field of funds
is a monumental task. One possible way to sort the range of ESG
investment products is between lower-fee generalist ESG funds and
higher-fee specialty ESG funds with a thematic investment focus such as
clean water. Specialty ESG funds, while expensive, offer the most ESGdistinctive strategies, holdings, and voting patterns in our case study,
suggesting that perhaps investors get the ESG that they pay for.
With only such rough guidance, gaining traction on the difficult
matching problem in the massively expanding pool of new (or rebranded)
ESG investment products will require more than passionate declarations
of purpose by industry leaders. At present—at least in the United States—
the ESG aspects of these products are unregulated. Fund creators and
index providers are pursuing their own interests in increasing revenues
and market share by cultivating a market in which ESG functions as
branding to signal a normatively “good” fund. In reality, the investment
landscape is highly variable in terms of ESG differentiation and those
variations are not facially obvious. As demand for ESG investment
products increases across a range of investors and geographies, investors
may propel fund creators and index providers to improve ESG
distinctiveness and transparency. Market forces alone, though, are
unlikely to correct the incentives for opacity and variation that risk
widespread mismatching. In contrast, changes to securities disclosure
mandates, ERISA law, and index regulation could hasten improvements.
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Solving the ESG investor matching puzzle is critical and could do
great good, but the power of business to tackle environmental social
problems should not be oversold. Market players in ESG investing can be
expected to continue to act in their own self-interest, even if pressure for
consistency and transparency from customers or regulators increases.
When this self-interest aligns with the interests of society—and especially
when environmental and social responsibility aligns with financial
return—the rest of us can free ride. But nobody should expect a complete
overlap. Even if consistency and transparency in ESG investing improves,
additional efforts by governments, the private sector, and countless
individual actors are necessary to make real progress on many systemic
challenges facing global society today.
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APPENDIX II
Top 10 Portfolio Holdings of Sample Funds (2018)
*High household name brand recognition denoted by HNB
ESGP SAMPLE (n= 14 )
Vanguard FTSE Social Index Inv. HNB
Wells Fargo & Co
Cisco Systems Inc
Mastercard Inc A
Procter & Gamble Co The Home Depot Inc Walt Disney Co
Intel Corp
Merck & Co Inc
Citigroup Inc
PepsiCo Inc
Calvert US Large Cap Core Rspn Idx I HNB
Apple Inc
Amazon. com Inc
Visa Inc Class A
Alphabet Inc A
JPMorgan Chase &
AT&T Inc
Co
Microsoft Corp
Bank of America
Pfizer Inc
Corp.
Intel Corp
iShares MSCI KLD 400 Social ETFHNB
Microsoft Corp
Alphabet Inc A
Intel Corp
Facebook Inc A
Verizon Comm. Inc
Procter & Gamble
Co
Alphabet Inc Class C
Cisco Systems Inc
Merck & Co Inc
Coca-Cola Co
PowerShares Water Resources ETF
Waters Corp
Xylem Inc/NY
IDEX Corp
Danaher Corp
Toro Co/The
HD Supply
Holdings Inc
Roper Technologies
Pentair PLC
AO Smith Corp
Inc
Rexnord Corp
PAX MSCI EAFE ESG Leaders Index Instl HNB
Roche Holding AG
Commonwealth Bank Unilever NV
Dividend Right Cert.
of Australia CBA
DR UNA
ROG
GlaxoSmithKline
Basf SE BAS
Siemens AG SIE
PLC GSK
SAP SE SAP
Novo Nordisk A/S
Allianz SE ALV
B NOVO B

2008
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iShares MSCI USA ESG Select ETFHNB
Microsoft
3M
EcoLab Inc
Accenture
Apple Inc
Alphabet
Guggenheim S&P Global Water ETF
Xylem Inc/NY
Geberit AG
Danaher Corp
Pentair PLC
IDEX Corp
Alfa Laval AB
iShares MSCI ACWI Low Carbon Target ETF
Apple Inc.
Johnson & Johnson
Microsoft
Facebook
Amazon com Inc
Alphabet Inc. Class A
Calvert Global Water A
American Water
Works Co Inc
Cia de Saneamento de
Minas GeraisCOPASA
Veolia
Environnement SA

Blackrock
Agilent Tech. Inc.
Northern Trust Cor.
Prologis REIT Inc.
Tetra Tech Inc
Coway Co Ltd
Aalberts Industries
NV
ANDRITZ AG
JP Morgan
Alphabet Inc.
Pfizer Inc
Bank of America
Corp.

United Utilities
Group PLC
Guangdong
Investment Ltd

Suez

Cia de Saneamento
do Parana

Beijing Enterprises
Water Group Ltd
American States
Water Co

Guggenheim Solar ETF
First Solar Inc FSLR
SolarEdge Tech.
Inc SEDG
Sunrun Inc RUN
Canadian Solar
Inc CSIQ
Scatec Solar ASA SSO
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Meyer Burger
Technology
AG MBTN

Pennon Group PLC

Enphase Energy
Inc ENPH
Hannon Armstrong
Sustainable
Infrastructure
Capital Inc HASI
SunPower
Corp SPWR
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Green Century MSCI International Index Fund - Institution
Kao Corp.
Nintendo Co. Ltd.
RELX PLC
Intesa Sanpaolo S. p.
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Schneider Electric
A.
Arg. S. A.
SE
Kering
KDDI Corp.
Canadian Imperial
Bank of Comm.
Adidas AG
Praxis Growth Index Fund A HNB
Apple Inc
Alphabet Inc Class C UnitedHealth
Group Inc
Microsoft Corp
Facebook Inc A
The Home Depot
Inc
Amazon. com Inc
Visa Inc Class A
Alphabet Inc A
Mastercard Inc A
Praxis International Index A
Nestle SA
Toyota Motor Corp
HSBC Holdings
PLC
Tencent Holdings Ltd Equinor ASA
Alibaba Group
Holding Ltd
Taiwan
Roche Holding AG
Chunghwa Telecom
Semiconductor
Co Ltd
Manufacturing Co Ltd
AstraZeneca PLC
Praxis Value Index AHNB
Apple Inc
UnitedHealth Group Walmart Inc
Inc
JPMorgan Chase &
AT&T Inc
Citigroup Inc
Co
Bank of America
Johnson & Johnson
DowDuPont Inc
Corp.
Procter & Gamble
Co
Walmart Inc
ESG Fund sample (n=17)
Parnassus Core Equity Investor HNB
Xylem Inc
VF Corp
WD-40 Co
Verisk Analytics Inc

Sysco Corp
Synopsys Inc

2010
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Waste Management
United Parcel Service
Inc
Inc Class B
Walt Disney Co
JPMorgan Emerging Markets Equity A
Housing
Tencent Holdings
Development
Ltd
Finance Corp Ltd
Alibaba Group
Samsung Electronics
Holding Ltd ADR
Co Ltd
Ping An Insurance
(Group) Co. of
AIA Group Ltd
China Ltd H
Taiwan
Semiconductor
Manufacturing Co
Ltd ADR
Parnassus Endeavor Investor HNB
Micron Technology
Qualcomm Inc
Inc
United Parcel Service
Mattel Inc
Inc Class B
Alliance Data
CVS Health Corp
Systems Corp
Gilead Sciences Inc
TIAA-CREF Social Choice Eq Instl HNB
Procter & Gamble
Apple Inc
Co
Microsoft Corp
Cisco Systems Inc
Bank of America
Corporation
Intel Corp
The Home Depot Inc
Calvert Equity A HNB
Thermo Fisher
Scientific Inc
Microsoft Corp
Danaher Corp
Praxair Inc
Alphabet Inc Class C Dollar General Corp
Visa Inc Class A
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Starbucks Corp

Sberbank of Russia
PJSC
HDFC Bank Ltd
MercadoLibre Inc

Allergan PLC
Bristol-Myers Squibb
Company
Hanesbrands Inc

Merck & Co Inc
Coca-Cola Co
PepsiCo Inc

Zoetis Inc Class A
Mastercard Inc A
Intuit Inc
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Amana Growth Investor HNB
Adobe Systems Inc
Cisco Systems Inc
Apple Inc

China Construction
Bank Corp H

China Petroleum &
Chemical Corp H
Shares

PJSC Lukoil ADR
Sberbank of Russia
PJSC

AIA Group Ltd

Hologic Inc
Teleflex Inc

Clorox Co
Iron Mountain Inc
MDU Resources
Group Inc

Verisk Analytics Inc Xylem Inc
First Horizon
National Corp
Neuberger Berman Socially Rspns Inv HNB
Progressive Corp
Comcast Corp Class
A
Texas Instruments
Inc
Advance Auto Parts
Inc

Alphabet Inc A
The Estee Lauder
Companies Inc Class
A

Amgen Inc
Church & Dwight Co
Inc
Harris Corp

Intuit Inc
TJX Companies Inc
Hartford Schroders Emerging Mkts Eq I
Tencent Holdings
Ltd
Samsung Electronics
Co Ltd
Alibaba Group
Holding Ltd
Taiwan
Semiconductor
Manufacturing Co
Ltd
Parnassus Mid-Cap
Motorola Solutions
Inc
Fiserv Inc

2011

Aptiv PLC
Danaher Corp
Becton, Dickinson
and Co

Naspers Ltd Class N

Intercontinental
Exchange Inc
The Kroger Co
Alphabet Inc A

2012
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Eventide Gilead
XPO Logistics Inc
Splunk Inc
Wayfair Inc Class A
HubSpot Inc
Ascendis Pharma
Palo Alto Networks
A/S ADR
Inc
Lowe’s Companies
Inc
Domini Impact International Equity Inv
Sanofi SA
Kering SA
Nissan Motor Co Ltd
Allianz SE
Central Japan
Railway Co
Sandvik AB
Vodafone Group
PLC
Amana Income Investor HNB
Parker Hannifin
Eli Lilly and Co
Corp
Microsoft Corp
Pfizer Inc
Honeywell Internat’l
3M Co
Inc
Rockwell
Automation Inc
AB Sustainable Global Thematic A
MSCI Inc

Visa Inc Class A
UnitedHealth Group
Inc
Ecolab Inc

Xylem Inc
Hexcel Corp
Housing
Development
Finance Corp Ltd
RBC Emerging Markets Equity I
Naspers Ltd Class N AIA Group Ltd
Housing
Development
Finance Corp Ltd
Unilever PLC
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Macquarie
Infrastructure Corp
Instructure Inc
Lam Research Corp

Novartis AG
Koninklijke Ahold
Delhaize NV
AXA SA

Canadian Nat’l
Railway Co
DowDuPont Inc
PPG Industries Inc

Infineon
Technologies AG
Kingspan Group PLC
American Water
Works Co Inc

Credicorp Ltd
SM Investments Corp

2020]
Tata Consultancy
Services Ltd
Taiwan
Semiconductor
Manufacturing Co
Ltd

BUYER BEWARE

Antofagasta PLC

Calvert Emerging Markets Equity I
Wal – Mart de
Mexico SAB de CV
Techtronic
Class V
Industries Co Ltd
Ultrapar
Participacoes SA

Tech Mahindra Ltd
Taiwan
Semiconductor
Manufacturing Co
Ltd ADR

Tong Yang Industry
Co Ltd
Tencent Holdings
Ltd
Morgan Stanley Inst Global Opp IHNB
Amazon.com Inc
DSV A/S
TAL Education
Mastercard Inc A
Group ADR
Facebook Inc A
Alphabet Inc C
Booking Holdings
Inc
Pax Global Environmental Mrkts Instl
Sealed Air Corp
Suez SA
Siemens AG
Danaher Corp
East Japan Railway
Co
Ecolab Inc
TE Connectivity Ltd

Non-ESG SAMPLE (n= 7)
Morgan Stanley Global Core Portfolio HNB

2013
Shinhan Financial
Group Co Ltd

Shoprite Holdings
Ltd
Shenzhen
International
Holdings Ltd
Sberbank of Russia
PJSC ADR

Moncler SpA
Visa Inc Class A
Hermes International
SA

Ferguson PLC
Praxair Inc
Aptiv PLC

2014
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Tencent Holdings
Ryanair Holdings
Ltd. ADR
PLC ADR
JPMorgan Chase &
Co.
Mastercard Inc.
Apple Inc.
Taiwan
Nippon Telegraph & Semiconductor
Manufacturing Co.
Telephone Corp.
ADR
Ltd. ADR
iShares Core S&P 500 ETF HNB
Apple Inc.
JP Morgan Chase &
CO
Microsoft Corp
Berkshire Hathaway
Class B
Amazon Inc.
Alphabet Class C
Facebook Inc.
Neuberger Berman Large Cap Value Fund
American Electric
Power Co. Inc.
CME Group Inc. Cl A
Cabot Oil & Gas
Corp.
DTE Energy Co.
Centene Corp.
Equity Residential
Chubb Ltd.
TIAA-CREF Growth & Income Fund HNB
Abbott Laboratories Apple Inc.
Bank of America
AbbVie Inc.
Corp.
Alphabet Inc. Cl C
Boeing Co.
Amazon Inc.
Vanguard Equity Income Fund Investor Shares
Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co.
Coca-Cola Co.
Caterpillar Inc.
Comcast Corp. Cl A
Chevron Corp.
DowDuPont Inc.
Cisco Systems Inc.
Vanguard 500 S&P IndexHNB
Microsoft Corp
Johnson & Johnson
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Comcast Corp. Cl A
Booking Holdings
Inc.
VMware Inc.

Alphabet Class A
Johnson & Johnson
EXXON Mobil
Corp.

Exelon Corp.
Exxon Mobil Corp.
First Energy Corp

Chevron Corp.
Cisco Systems Inc.
Citigroup Inc.
HNB
Eli Lilly & Co.
Exxon Mobil Corp.
Intel Corp.

Facebook Inc A

2020]
Apple Inc

BUYER BEWARE
JPMorgan Chase &
Co
Alphabet Inc Class C

Amazon. com Inc
Berkshire Hathaway
Inc B
JPMorgan Emerging Economies Fund
Alibaba Group
Holding Ltd. ADR
Baidu Inc. ADR
Catcher Tech. Co.
Ltd.
China Const. Bank
Corp.

China Merchants
Bank Co. Ltd.
Chinatrust Financial
Holding Co. Ltd.
CNOOC Ltd.

2015
Alphabet Inc A
Exxon Mobil Corp

Cognizant
Technology
Solutions Corp.
Fubon Financial
Holding Co. Ltd.
Hana Financial
Group Inc.

2016
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APPENDIX III
2018 Voting Records Snapshot
Sample
Group

Passive
ESG

Fund Votes
Fund
Vanguard FTSE Social
Index
Calvert US Large Cap
Core Resp Index I
iShares MSCI KLD 400
Social ETF
PowerShares Water
Resources ETF 264
PAX MSCI EAFE ESG
Leaders Index Instl
iShares MSCI USA ESG
Select ETF
Guggenheim S&P Global
Water
iShares MSCI ACWI Low
Carbon Target ETF
Calvert Global Water A
Guggenheim Solar ETF

Climate
Change

Gender
Pay/
Diversity

Political
Spending 263

1 against

5 against

17 against

4 against

5 for

16 for

1 for

9 for

11 for

0
proposals

0 proposals

0 proposals

3 for

8 for

12 for

1 for

9 for

11 for

0
proposals

2 for

1 for

split, 1-1 265

split, 11-1

17 for

1 for

3 for

split, 11-1

0 proposals

0
proposals
0
proposals

263 Many of the funds in our sample voted on management proposals to authorize political
spending, per European regulations. As these were not shareholder proposals, we do not report
votes on them in Table 4.
264 Several funds in our sample faced no relevant votes on our selected ESG issues during our
sample period. Indeed, some faced no ESG-related proposals at all. Funds without reportable votes
were primarily those dedicated to emerging market companies.
265 Split votes are reported in the format for-against unless the fund abstained, in which case
votes are reported in the format for-against-abstention.

BUYER BEWARE

2020]

Green Century MSCI
International Index Fund
- Institution
Praxis Growth Index Fund
Praxis International Index
Praxis Value Index
Pax Global Environmental
Markets Instl
Morgan Stanley Inst
Global Opp I
Calvert Emerging Markets
Equity I
RBC Emerging Markets
Equity I
AB Sustainable Global
Thematic A
Amana Income Investor
ESG

Domini Impact
International Equity Inv
Eventide Gilead N
Neuberger Berman
Socially Rspns Inv
Parnassus Mid-Cap
Hartford Schroders
Emerging Mkts Eq I

0
proposals

9 for

0 proposals

6 for

12 for

0 proposals
6 for

0 proposals
9 for

9 for

7 for

0 proposals

0 proposals

0 proposals

0 proposals

0 proposals

0 proposals

1 for

3 for

0 proposals

split 4-1 266

5 for

3 for

2 for

0 proposals

1 for

1 for

3 for

0
proposals

8 for

2 for

2 against

split 2-1-4

5 against

split, 1-1

2 for

0 proposals

2 for

0 proposals

0 proposals

0
proposals
2 against
1 for
3 for
0
proposals
0
proposals
0
proposals
0
proposals
0
proposals
0
proposals
0
proposals

0
proposals
Calvert Equity A
2 for
TIAA-CREF Social Choice 0
Eq Instl 267
proposals
Amana Growth Investor

266
267

2017

The negative vote opposed a proposal to require cost-benefit analysis of political spending.
Votes for TIAA-CREF Social Choice Eq Instl do not appear in the relevant N-PX report.

2018

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

Parnassus Endeavor
Investor
JPMorgan Emerging
Markets Equity A
Parnassus Core Equity
Investor
Morgan Stanley Global
Core Portfolio
iShares Core S&P 500 ETF
Neuberger Berman Large
Cap Value Fund
Non-ESG TIAA-CREF Growth &
Income Fund
Vanguard Equity Income
Fund Investor Shares
JP Morgan Emerging
Markets

0
proposals
0
proposals
0
proposals
0
proposals
10 against
1 for
0
proposals
0
proposals
0
proposals
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3 for

1 for

0 proposals

0 proposals

5 for

1 for

split 1-2

4 for

split 2-7

14 against

split 6-2

split 2-2

1 for

split 2-3-5

split 8-3

18 against

0 proposals

0 proposals

